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CLOSING A LOOPHOLE IN
ACCOUNTABILITY FOR WAR CRIMES:
SUCCESSOR COMMANDERS' DUTY TO
PUNISH KNOWN PAST OFFENSES
In the last decade, international humanitarian law has made sig-
nificant progress in its efforts to protect human rights by prosecuting
individuals responsible for violations of those rights. The United
Nations ad hoc criminal tribunals for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY)
and for Rwanda (ICTR), as well as the Special Court in Sierra Leone,
are seeking to hold accountable individuals who instigated or toler-
ated atrocities in those countries' conflicts, from high-level govern-
ment officials to influential authority figures at lower levels in mili-
tary and civilian organizations. This Note addresses a problem that
has recently arisen in that process. The wording of Article 28 in the
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court and a recent deci-
sion by the Appeals Chamber for the ICTY/R have created a loophole
in accountability for military commanders in a very specific but not
very unusual situation-when a successor commander fails to punish
known crimes committed by his subordinates before he took control.'
This loophole should be closed in order to help the international
community bring the age of impunity to a close.
The duty of a military commander to punish his subordinates who
violate the laws of war is well established. The particular issue of
whether this duty extends to a successor commander was explicitly
raised for the first time before the Appeals Chamber of the Interna-
tional Criminal Tribunals in an interlocutory appeal on behalf of Amir
Kubura, a commander in the army of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Kub-
ura was charged with command responsibility for killings, cruel
treatment of prisoners, and wanton destruction and plunder of prop-
erty committed by members of his corps between January 1993 and
January 1994. He acted as substitute commander of the 3rd Corps,
7th Muslim Mountain Brigade beginning on April 1, 1993, and was
I For the sake of economy, I will refer to this fact pattern as "successor commanders'
duty to punish."
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appointed commander on July 21; several of the charges originally
brought against him "concern events that started and ended before
Kubura became the commander of the troops allegedly involved in
those events." 2 The indictment asserts that "Kubura knew or had rea-
son to know about these crimes," and that "[a]fter he assumed com-
mand, he was under the duty to punish the perpetrators. 3 This duty
was particularly urgent since "the troops commanded by [Kubura]
from April 1993 had a history of unpunished criminality.' 4 The trial
chamber held that in principle, a commander could be held responsi-
ble for failure to punish violations committed by his subordinates
under a predecessor commander.5 The Appeals Chamber, in a 3-2
decision, reversed that holding, declaring that "an accused cannot be
charged under Article 7(3) of the [ICTY] Statute for crimes commit-
ted by a subordinate before the said accused assumed command over
that subordinate.",
6
This Note will argue that the Appeals Chamber's decision in this
case should not be followed in the future and that steps should be
taken to clarify interpretation of the Rome Statute so as to prevent
such an outcome before the International Criminal Court. It will re-
view the history of command responsibility doctrine (the customary
international law at issue here) to show that the doctrine's underlying
premises support enforcement of a successor commander's duty to
punish. It will then argue that historical, statutory, and publicist sup-
port for such enforcement is even stronger than the opinions of the
Appeals Chamber's dissenting judges indicate. Finally, it will pro-
pose possible steps to be taken to close the accountability loophole.
The closing of this gap in international humanitarian law is crucial
because this gap will otherwise allow certain atrocities to go unpun-
ished, and thus dilute the effectiveness of worldwide efforts to in-
crease accountability for human rights violations. The long-range
goal of accountability, of course, is to reduce the likelihood of future
violations by putting potential offenders on notice that offenses will
2 Decision on Interlocutory Appeal Challenging Jurisdiction in Relation to Command
Responsibility (Prosecutor v. Hadzihasanovic), IT 01-47-AR72 (ICTY), 39 (July 16, 2003),
http://www.un.orglicty/hadzihas/appealldecision-e/0
3 0 716.htm [hereinafter Interlocutory Ap-
peal].
3 Interlocutory Appeal, supra note 2, 38 (quoting Amended Indictment (Prosecutor v.
Hadzihasanovic), T-01-47-PT (ICTY), 58 (Jan. 11, 2002),
http://www.un.org/icty/indictment/english/had-ai02Ol 1 le.htm).
4 Interlocutory Appeal, supra note 2, 43 (quoting Prosecution's Response to Defence
Written Submissions on Joint Challenge to Jurisdiction Arising from the Amended Indictment
(Prosecutor v. Hadzihasanovic), IT 01-47 (ICTY), 21 (May 24, 2002)).
5 See Interlocutory Appeal, supra note 2, 5 (citing Decision Pursuant to Rule 72(E) as
to Validity of Appeal, (Prosecutor v. Hanzihasanovic), IT-01-47 (ICTY), T 202 (Feb. 21, 2003).
6 Interlocutory Appeal, supra note 2, 51.
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be punished. This deterrent value benefits all people in all countries
because a viable system of international humanitarian law will help
prevent future threats to international peace and security. Thus, a
weak element in such a body of law should be addressed and
strengthened as soon and as much as possible.
I. HISTORICAL EVOLUTION OF COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY
DOCTRINE
Command responsibility doctrine is the well-settled principle that
a military commander may be held criminally responsible for viola-
tions of the laws of war committed by his subordinates if he either
orders such violations or fails to prevent, halt, or punish their perpe-
tration. If a commander actually orders violations, his participation in
the violation is direct and relatively easy to establish; therefore, "[t]he
doctrine of command responsibility is normally viewed in the litera-
ture as ... primarily concerned with responsibility for failure to act"
to prevent, halt, or punish violations.7 This doctrine puts responsibil-
ity on military commanders to maintain "the most difficult kind of
'law and order,' law and order in the fury and devastation of war."8
Command responsibility doctrine has developed over centuries in
military practice and theory, and its application has also been docu-
mented over thousands of years, so its broad outlines are well en-
trenched in customary international law. However, only in the past
century have attempts been made to codify the elements of command
responsibility, first in treaties and later in statutes establishing various
tribunals. The codifications generally agree on four elements re-
quired for proof of command criminal responsibility:
1) a violation of the laws of war must have occurred;
2) a superior/subordinate relationship must exist between the
commander and the perpetrator(s);
3) the superior must have knowledge of the violation; and
7 W. J. Fenrick, Some International Law Problems Related to Prosecutions Before the In-
ternational Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 6 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L. L. 103, 110(1995-1996). Fenrick is Senior Legal Advisor in the ICTY Office of the Prosecutor. In this
paper, I will follow Fenrick's practice of using "command responsibility" to refer to the failure-
to-act offense. Where a distinction between this and the offense of ordering violations is
needed, I will refer to ordering violations as "direct" and failure to prevent, halt, or punish
violations as "indirect" command responsibility.
8 William V. O'Brien, The Law of War, Command Responsibility and Vietnam, 60 GEO.
L.J. 605, 606 (1971-1972).
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4) the superior must have failed to prevent or halt the viola-
tion, or to punish the perpetrator(s).9
In contemporary terms, "the scope of [the] command responsibility
[doctrine, which determines the degree to which a leader can insulate
himself from criminal culpability when his subordinates commit
criminal acts,] remains one of the most important issues in prosecut-
ing human rights atrocities."' The broad scope of this doctrine, in-
cluding its application to successor commanders, is supported by his-
torical records of its enforcement.
A. Earliest Records of Command Responsibility Including Duty to
Punish
"The first duty of a military commander . . . is to exercise com-
mand," and this duty, including "penal action against violators" is
"the very essence of . . .enforcement of treaty rules in the field.""
This principle is well grounded in military history. The pervasiveness
of the duty to punish (whose omission was called "a new crime" by
defendants as late as the post-World War II Yamashita case)' 2 sup-
ports the assumption that its temporal application should be inter-
preted broadly.
1. Responsibility for Military Objectives: Sun Tzu
As far back as military organizations have operated, or at least as
far back as their operations have been analyzed in writing, a com-
mander's influence over his troops has been recognized. In the oldest
known military treatise, dating to 500 B.C.E., Sun Tzu wrote,
"[w]hen troops flee, are insubordinate, distressed, collapse in disor-
der, or are routed, it is the fault of the general."' 3 Sun Tzu's attention
was focused on the importance of effective command to military suc-
cess-the first and most obvious prong of direct command responsi-
bility. But in a demonstration of his theory, when officers failed to
9 Daryl A. Mundis, Crimes of the Commander: Superior Responsibility under Article
7(3) of the ICTY Statute, in 6 INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW DEVELOPMENTS IN THE CASE
LAW OF THE ICTY 239, 250 (Gideon Boas & William A. Schabas eds., 2003).
I0 STEVEN R. RATNER & JASON S. ABRAMS, ACCOUNTABILITY FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
ATROCITIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: BEYOND THE NUREMBERG LEGACY 128 (1997).
11 CLAUDE PILLOUD ET AL., COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE
1977 TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949 1017-18 (Yves Sandoz et al. eds.,
1987).
12 RICHARD L. LAEL, THE YAMASHITA PRECEDENT: WAR CRIMES AND COMMAND
RESPONSIBILITY 97 (1982).
13 Major William H. Parks, Command Responsibility for War Crimes, 62 MIL. L. REV. 1, 3
(1973) (quoting SUN TZU, THE ART OF WAR 125 (Samuel B. Griffith trans., 1963)).
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discipline their troops, Sun Tzu declared the officers at fault and had
them beheaded-after which the troops performed faultlessly under
newly appointed officers.' 4 Though Sun Tzu's focus was on the
troops' failure to achieve their military objective rather than on sub-
ordinates' violating laws of war, this example does set a precedent of
punishing officers who fail to punish their subordinates.
2. Command Criminal Responsibility: Fifteenth-Century Europe
Superiors' criminal responsibility for crimes committed by subor-
dinates has also been recognized from very early times. In 1439,
Charles VII of France issued an Ordinance at Orleans that set out a
strong policy of command responsibility including a clear duty to
punish:
The King orders that each captain or lieutenant be held re-
sponsible for the abuses, ills and offences committed by
members of his company, and that as soon as he receives any
complaint concerning any such misdeed or abuse, he bring
the offender to justice so that the said offender be punished in
a manner commensurate with his offence, according to these
ordinances. If he fails to do so or covers up the misdeed or
delays taking action, or if, because of his negligence or oth-
erwise, the offender escapes and thus evades punishment, the
captain shall be deemed responsible for the offence as if he
had committed it himself and shall be punished in the same
way as the offender would have been.' 5
Evidence that this approach to command responsibility was not
only announced but also followed in the fifteenth century comes from
the case of Peter von Hagenbach, who in 1474 was tried by an inter-
national tribunal of twenty-eight judges from allied states of the Holy
Roman Empire on charges of failing to prevent his subordinates from
committing murder, rape, perjury, and other crimes against "the laws
of God and man."' 6 The tribunal held that Hagenbach had a duty to
prevent such crimes; convicted of failing to do so, he was deprived of
his knighthood and executed. 7
1 Id. at 4.
1' L.C. Green, Command Responsibility in International Humanitarian Law, 5
TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 319, 321 (1995) (citation omitted).16 Waldemar A. Solf, A Response to Telford Taylor's Nuremberg and Vietnam: An Ameri-
can Tragedy, 5 AKRON L. REV. 43, 65 n.89 (1972).
17 Id. at 65. See also Captain Jordan J. Paust, My Lai and Vietnam: Norms, Myths and
Leader Responsibility, 57 Mn. L. REV. 99, 112 (1972).
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3. Clarification of Rationale: 1 h and 1 9'h Century Documents
Another early codification of this principle of indirect command
responsibility (duty to punish unordered violations) appears in the
1775 Massachusetts Articles of War, where the eleventh article states:
Every Officer commanding, in quarters, or on a march, shall
keep good order, and to the utmost of his power, redress all
such abuses or disorders which may be committed by any Of-
ficer or Soldier under his command; if upon complaint made
to him of Officers or Soldiers beating or otherwise ill-treating
any person, or committing any kind of riots to the disquieting
of the inhabitants of the Continent, he, the said commander,
who shall refuse or omit to see Justice done to this offender
or offenders, and reparation made to the party or parties in-
jured, as soon as the offender's wages shall enable him or
them, upon due proof thereof, be punished, as ordered by
General Court-Martial, in such manner as if he himself had
committed the crimes or disorders complained of.
18
Thus, by the end of the eighteenth century, a firm foundation was
established for the responsibility of a military commander not only to
refrain from issuing illegal orders, but to "see Justice done" with re-
gard to any illegal acts by his subordinates of which he became
aware; the penalty for refusal or omission to perform this duty was
punishment "as if he himself had committed the crimes. ' ' 9 Accep-
tance of this responsibility is part of the commander's duty, and his
failure to prevent, halt, or punish violations is treated both as a breach
of duty and as acquiescence in the crimes. William Winthrop, in his
authoritative nineteenth-century commentary on Military Law and
Precedents, further clarified the rationale for enforcing this duty when
he emphasized that, both under the American Articles of War and the
general obligations of the laws of war, "[t]he observance of the rule
protecting from violence the unarmed population is especially to be
enforced by commanders in occupying or passing through towns or
villages of the enemy's country., 20 Winthrop wrote in the aftermath
of the American Civil War.21 These early emphases on the protection
18 Parks, supra note 13, at 5 (citing Articles of War, Provisional Congress of Massachu-
setts Bay, April 5, 1775) (emphasis omitted).
19 Id.
20 WILLIAM WINTHROP, MILITARY LAW AND PRECEDENTS 779 (2d ed. 1920).
21 The Civil War's Lieber Code, which dealt extensively with the conduct of military
forces in the field, did not specifically treat the subject of failure to prevent or punish illegal
conduct by subordinates. Article 71 of the Lieber Code did, however, provide the death penalty
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of the civilian population lay the foundation for broad temporal appli-
cation of the duty to punish, since consistent punishment is clearly
such an important part of deterring violations by subordinates-and
impunity, as is often observed, encourages further violations.
a. Twentieth-Century Documents Codifying Command
Responsibility
The most important early codifications of international humanitar-
ian law were initiated by the International Committee of the Red
Cross (ICRC) and include the First Geneva Convention of 1864, the
Hague Conventions of 1907, the Geneva Conventions of 1949, and
the Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of
12 August 1949.22 While many other treaties and statutes have been
drafted, the ICRC Conventions and Protocols remain a fundamental
source of authority in this area.
i. Pre- WWII Codifications, First Applied Post- WWII
When the Nuremberg International Military Tribunal was con-
vened at the close of World War II, it drew its basic principles on the
law of war from the 1907 Hague Convention (IV) respecting the
Laws and Customs of War on Land and its Annex: Regulations con-
cerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land,23 which the Tribunal
declared had "undoubtedly represented an advance over existing in-
ternational law at the time of their adoption. . . but by 1939 ... were
recognized by all civilized nations, and were regarded as being de-
claratory of the laws and customs of war.' '24 Treatment of command
responsibility doctrine in the 1907 Hague Convention was limited to
for anyone who intentionally mistreated a wounded enemy, or for "[wihoever ... orders or
encourages soldiers to do so." Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States
in the Field, General Orders No. 100, Article 71 (1863) (the Lieber Code) (reprinted in THE
LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICTS 13 (Dietrich Schindler & Jiri Toman eds., 1988)).
22 See PILLOUD, supra note 11. The editors' note points out that:
[T]he expression international humanitarian law applicable in armed conflict
means international rules, established by treaties or custom, which are specifically
intended to solve humanitarian problems directly arising from international or non-
international armed conflicts and which, for humanitarian reasons, limit the right of
Parties to a conflict to use the methods and means of warfare of their choice or pro-
tect persons and property that are, or may be, affected by conflict. The expression
'international humanitarian law applicable in armed conflict' is often abbreviated to
international humanitarian law or humanitarian law.
Id. at xxvii.
23 THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICTS, supra note 21, at 63-93.
24 Judicial Decisions: International Military Tribunal (Nuremberg), Judgment and Sen-
tences: October 1, 1946, 41 AM. J. INT'L L. 172, 248-49 (1947).
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
its provision in Article 3 that "if there was a violation of the articles
or regulations that the belligerent State so violating them would be
responsible for the acts committed by its military and would be liable
to pay compensation for the same. ' 25 While this provision holds a
violating State responsible, it does not address individual criminal
responsibility for the violations. That concept was written into inter-
national humanitarian law in the wake of World War I, when the Pre-
liminary Peace Conference at Versailles appointed a Commission on
the Responsibility of the Authors of the War and on Enforcement of
Penalties. The report of this Commission concluded that "[a]ll per-
sons . . . however high their position may have been ... who have
been guilty of offences against the laws and customs of war or the
laws of humanity, are liable to criminal prosecution.' 26  However,
while the victorious Allies drew up a list of hundreds of accused vio-
lators (including the Kaiser) with plans to try them in an international
military tribunal, political considerations resulted in the decimation of
the list and its processing by German courts rather than the convening
of an international tribunal.27 Frustrated by this outcome, the Allied
Powers sought in the Nuremberg International Military Tribunal, as
well as the other post-World War II tribunals, to combine the 1907
Hague Convention principles with the 1919 Commission's attention
to individual criminal responsibility for a broad exercise of interna-
tional humanitarian law.28
ii. Expansion of Command Responsibility Doctrine in Post-
WWII Trials
The issue of indirect command criminal responsibility (criminal li-
ability for failure to prevent, halt, or redress violations) arose specifi-
cally in several post-World War II cases, and the standards for con-
viction on these charges have been extensively argued. The following
discussion will show that support for successor commanders' liability
is inherent in these early cases.
25 Stuart E. Hendin, Command Responsibility and Superior Orders in the Twentieth Cen-
tury-A Century of Evolution, 10 MURDOCH U. ELEC. J. OF L., 13 (Mar. 2003), at http://www.
murdoch.edu.au/elaw/issues/vlOnl/hendinl0 I.html.
26 Commission on the Responsibility of the Authors of the War and on Enforcement of
Penalties: Report Presented to the Preliminary Peace Conference: March 29, 1919, 14 AM. J.
INT'L L. 95, 117 (1920) (emphasis removed).
27 See LAEL, supra note 12, at 42 (detailing the change in plans).
28 The first trials were held by an American Military Commission convened in Manila by
General MacArthur. Later, International Military Tribunals were held in Nuremberg and To-
kyo, and further tribunals were established by the individual occupying powers-among them,
the American tribunals at Nuremberg under Control Council Law No. 10 which will be dis-
cussed infra in text accompanying notes 138-151.
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a) Yamashita: The First Important WW II Command
Responsibility Case
The first and probably the most notorious World War II command
responsibility prosecution was that of General Tomoyuki Yamashita,
who was in charge of Japanese troops in the Philippines while Ameri-
can forces were re-establishing control there. Yamashita was charged
with failure to control his troops and thus held criminally responsible
for the abuse, rape, and murder of thousands of Filipino civilians and
American prisoners of war during the last stage of the Japanese occu-
pation. He was tried, convicted, and sentenced to death by an Ameri-
can military commission convened by General Douglas MacArthur.
Most of the subsequent discussion of the Yamashita case has dealt
with the knowledge and control standards applied there,29 and with
the question of whether the tribunal held Yamashita to a "strict liabil-
ity" standard, issues that are beyond the scope of this Note. But an
important element of the defense argument in Yamashita was the
principle of nullum crimen sine lege.30 In an unsuccessful clemency
appeal, the defense asserted that:
This is the first time in modem history that a com-
manding officer has been held criminally liable for
acts committed by his troops .... The accused could
not have known, nor could a sage have predicted, that
at some time in the future a Military Commission
would decree [these] acts.., to be a crime ....
Again in its unsuccessful procedural appeal to the United States Su-
preme Court, Yamashita's defense counsel asserted that the Army had
failed to charge Yamashita with a "traditional violation of the law of
war," and thus that the Military Commission trial was inherently un-
constitutional. 32 The prosecution successfully rebutted these argu-
ments by reference to "three crucial international agreements: Articles
1 and 43 of the annex to the Fourth Hague Convention, Article 19 of
the Tenth Hague Convention, and Article 26 of the Geneva Red Cross
29 These are the second and third prongs of the command responsibility definition. See
supra text accompanying note 9.
30 Also called the principle of legality, an international law analog to the U. S. Constitu-
tion's prohibition of ex post facto laws.
31 LAEL, supra note 12, at 97 (quoting Yamashita defense clemency petition).
32 Id. at 101 (quoting Colonel Clarke who characterized command responsibility as a
"novel concept").
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Convention of 1929. All imposed grave responsibilities on military
commanders, responsibilities that Yamashita had ignored. 33
Although Yamashita's conviction did not hinge on temporal appli-
cation of the command responsibility doctrine, the defeat of his de-
fense plea of nullum crimen sine lege by reference to earlier codifica-
tions of customary international law set a precedent that is informa-
tive in the present discussion. The fact that these codifications ex-
isted, and that they were viewed as articulations of customary interna-
tional law and enforceable as such, formed the basis for Yamashita's
command responsibility. The defense argument that the established
laws had not previously been applied in exactly the way they were in
Yamashita's case did not override the Commission's decision that the
combination of customary international law with the facts of Yama-
shita's case warranted his conviction. Similarly, the absence of a
precedential case with an exact articulation of command criminal
liability for a successor commander's failure to punish should not
prevent the consideration of relevant facts in cases before present and
future international criminal tribunals.
b) Further Development of Command Responsibility Doctrine
in Other Post- WWII Tribunals
The trials of war criminals in the aftermath of World War II were
conducted by tribunals established under national military regulations
in the Far East and in Europe, as well as by International Military
Tribunals at Nuremberg and Tokyo established for the special trial of
"the major instigators of the war."3 4 In most of the cases before these
tribunals, indirect command responsibility was not a main issue, since
the accused were charged either with having planned and directed the
atrocities or with having issued or transmitted illegal orders-that is,
with direct command responsibility rather than with indirect com-
mand responsibility ("indirect" indicating failure to act in prevention
or punishment of violations). The most extensive discussion of indi-
rect command responsibility occurred in two cases before American
military tribunals under Control Council Law No. 10-trials of Ger-
man field commanders in cases known as the High Command Case
33 Id. at 102. The Fourth Hague Convention provisions cited require belligerent forces
"[t]o be commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates" and an occupying com-
mander to "take all measures in his power to restore, and ensure, as far as possible, public order
and safety." Id. at 143-44. The Tenth Hague Convention article 19 and the Red Cross Conven-
tion article 26 require commanders-in-chief to "provide for the details of execution of the fore-
going articles, as well as for unforeseen cases ... conformabl[e] to the general principles" of the
conventions as a whole. Id.
14 Id. at 72.
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and the Hostages Case.35  The courts in those cases established a
fairly heavy burden on the prosecutors to prove command criminal
responsibility: in cases where the commander's "failure to properly
supervise his subordinates constitutes criminal negligence ... it must
be a personal neglect amounting to a wanton, immoral disregard of
the action of his subordinates amounting to acquiescence. 36  But
under this standard they did convict several commanders on com-
mand criminal responsibility charges. In this context, it has been sig-
nificantly argued that in the High Command Case, "Field Marshal
von Kuechler was held responsible for the illegal execution of Red
Army soldiers which occurred before (and after) he took up com-
mand, on the basis that word of all of these executions was reported
to his headquarters after he assumed command, yet he took no puni-
tive action., 37 This reading of the von Kuechler case, discussed be-
low, provides the most compelling precedent for the proposition that
"[a] superior's duty to punish subordinates ... extends to violations
that were committed before the superior assumed authority., 38
b. Increase of Command Responsibility Scholarship After My Lai
Massacre
After the conclusion of the post-World War II tribunals, public
concern with the enforcement of command responsibility waned.
However, the doctrine once again became a focus of legal as well as
military interest after the 1969 revelation that U. S. Army personnel
had perpetrated a massacre of Vietnamese civilians at the village of
My Lai on March 16, 1968.39 Two famous trials resulted from this
incident. Lieutenant William L. Calley, Jr., was charged both with
ordering the violations and with participating in them; Calley's con-
viction thus involved direct commission of crimes and direct com-
mand responsibility. Calley's immediate superior, Captain Ernest
Medina, was charged with indirect command responsibility and ac-
-5 "The High Command Trial," United States v. Wilhelm von Leeb et al., tried thirteen
high ranking German officers for (1) Crimes against Peace; (2) War Crimes; (3) Crimes against
Humanity; and (4) Conspiracy.... "The Hostages Case," U.S. v. Wilhelm List et al., tried twelve
high-ranking officers as principals and accessories to the murder and deportation of civilians,
carried out under their orders. These cases are reported in X and XI TRIALS OF WAR
CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUREMBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW
NO. 10 (1950) [hereinafter NUREMBERG TRIALS]. See also Parks, supra note 13, at 38-64 (dis-
cussing these cases extensively).
36 XI NUREMBERG TRIALS, supra note 35, at 543-44.
17 Sonja Boelaert-Suominen, Prosecuting Superiors for Crimes Committed by Subordi-
nates: A Discussion of the First Significant Case Law Since the Second World War, 41 VA. J.
INT'L L. 747, 767 (2000-2001).
38 Id.
19 See, e.g., O'Brien, supra note 8; Parks, supra note 13; Paust, supra note 17.
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quitted in a military trial that generated much discussion of the
knowledge standard to which commanders should be held.n0 Al-
though the Medina result prompted concern over whether the United
States Uniform Code of Military Justice was in keeping with interna-
tional standards4' no significant change in the customary international
law of command responsibility emerged from these trials.
42
However, during the same time period, the International Commit-
tee of the Red Cross (ICRC) was at work on the Additional Protocols
to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, with special interest in
improving "the protection of the civilian population against the dan-
gers of hostilities. ' 3 From this project, Articles 86 and 87 of Proto-
col I provided clarification of customary international law on "Failure
to act" and on "Duty of commanders" respectively. These Articles
are an important source of authority as well as of the language in the
current ad hoc International Criminal Tribunal Statutes, and their
goals as well as their language and history support the broad temporal
application of command responsibility. 44
i. World Events in the] 990's Prompting Action in this Field
In May of 1993 the United Nations Security Council established
the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
(ICTY). n5 This action was taken in response to "a high level of public
outrage" over atrocities being reported in the former Yugoslavia,
along with "doubt that the available national judicial systems (which
would usually be responsible for enforcing international humanitarian
law) [could] be either impartial or effective in punishing those re-
sponsible for violations. ''n6 The following year saw the establishment
of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR)47 after se-
40 See, e.g., LAEL, supra note 12; O'Brien, supra note 8; Parks, supra note 13; Paust, su-
pra note 17.
41 See, e.g., Colonel William G. Eckhardt, Command Criminal Responsibility: A Plea for
a Workable Standard, 97 MIL. L. REV. 1 (1982); O'Brien, supra note 8.
42 Fenrick, supra note 7, at 118.
43 PILLOUD, supra note 11, at xxxiv.
4 Articles 86 and 87 of Protocol I are discussed in detail infra, in text accompanying
notes 80-113.
45 Officially, this is the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible
for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the
Former Yugoslavia Since 1991. Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia, S.C. Res. 808, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3217th mtg., Annex, U.N. Doe. S/RES/808
(1993).
46 James C. O'Brien, Current Developments: The International Tribunal for Violations of
International Humanitarian Law in the Former Yugoslavia, 87 AM. J. INT'L L. 639, 639 (1993).
47 Officially, this is the International Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Re-
sponsible for Genocide and Other Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Com-
mitted in the Territory of Rwanda and Rwandan Citizens responsible for genocide and other
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rious violations occurred there and African representatives requested
action by the Security Council.
The Statutes of these tribunals, prepared by organs of the United
Nations, reflect the current state of customary international law. In
addition to the language of the statutes themselves, clarification of the
intent of the statutes is available from the Secretary General's Reports
on the statutes48 and the explanations of votes by the members of the
Security Council, as well as from numerous commentaries and sev-
eral years of case law that have emerged from the tribunals. The
combinations of these Statutes and their legislative histories, along
with the history and rationale of command responsibility doctrine and
comments by publicists specializing in both military and humanitar-
ian law, offer support for a broad temporal application of command
responsibility doctrine-including the enforcement of successor com-
manders' duty to punish.
In the following sections of this note I will first examine the doc-
trine's basis in military law. I will then consider the criminal-law
objections that chiefly underlie the Appeals Chamber's Hadzihasano-
vic decision, arguing that they are overcome by the developmental
history of the doctrine as well as by the legislative history of the
ICTY Statute and other relevant codifications. Finally, I will refer to
commentaries from humanitarian law specialists noting the impor-
tance of successor commanders' duty to punish, and propose steps
that might be taken to close the accountability gap which is left by the
recent decision against its enforcement.
II. THE ISSUE OF SUCCESSOR COMMANDERS' DUTY TO PUNISH:
MILITARY, CRIMINAL, AND HUMANITARIAN LAW PERSPECTIVES
Background information crucial to the issue of successor com-
manders' duty to punish lies in the fields of military law and general
criminal law, as well as in the developing body of international hu-
manitarian law.
such violations committed in the territory of neighboring States between 1 January 1994 and 31
December 1994. Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, S.C. Res. 955,
U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453d mtg., Annex, U.N. Doc S/RES/955 (1994).
48 Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolution
808, U.N. SCOR, U. N. Doc. S/25704 (1993) (on file with the Case Western Reserve University
Law Review); Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 5 of Security Council
Resolution 955, U.N. SCOR, U.N. Doc. S/1995/134 (1995).
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A. Military Tradition Providing Foundations for Successor
Commander Duty to Punish
In a discussion of Vietnam-era command responsibility issues,
Professor William V. O'Brien noted that "the international law of war
is . . . a challenging and complex body of law requiring constant re-
evaluation" 49 and that "the law of combat is eminently the law of
command decisions and command responsibility" in which "judg-
ments as to responsibility for belligerent behavior deemed unreason-
able... [u]sually... are made within the military command hierar-
chy." 50 It is noteworthy that up to the end of the nineteenth century,
the doctrine of command responsibility was defined by students and
practitioners of the profession of arms, rather than by those in the
professions of law or diplomacy. As noted above, that situation be-
gan to change in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.
Colonel William G. Eckhardt has suggested that some problems in
enforcement of the doctrine can be attributed to this change:
Prior to World War II, legal standards for commanders were
practical articulation of the accepted practice of military pro-
fessionals. This customary international law expressed sol-
dier's standards which were born on the battlefield and not
standards imposed upon them by dilettantes of a different dis-
cipline. Undoubtedly, the practicality of these rules led to
their general acceptance which in turn was responsible for
their codification. Such practical rules were understood and
enforced. Following the war crimes trials at the conclusion of
World War II, political implications intruded into what had
previously been a largely apolitical area.51
Eckhardt, who when writing this article was Chief of the Defense
Appellate Division, U.S. Army Legal Services Agency, asserts that
because "[t]he very words 'war crimes' became politically repulsive,"
countries "refused to label misconduct on the battlefield war crimes if
it could be handled domestically under some common law crime."
52
At the same time, he continues, "[a]political soldiers, sensing a politi-
cal pitfall, began to shun what was once the accepted practice of pro-
fessionals .... The soldier sees his iron law of war ... made much
less practical.,
53
49 O'Brien, supra note 8, at 608.
50 Id. at 659.
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Writing from a defense point of view, Eckhardt sought a "worka-
ble standard" that would make a soldier's duties as clear as (he im-
plies) they used to be before political and humanitarian-law consid-
erations intruded. Ultimately, as will be shown below, Eckhardt's
arguments and those of other military commentators weigh on the
side of enforcing successor commanders' duty to punish. The argu-
ments against enforcement are those that suggest nonmilitary observ-
ers cannot accurately evaluate the exigencies of combat situations.
1. Military Arguments Against Enforcement, Stressing Combat
Difficulties
From the defense of General Yamashita comes most vividly the
protest that a commander has immediate concerns with ongoing ac-
tivities that preclude his investigating or otherwise dealing with his
subordinates' past activities. Although Yamashita's case did not in-
volve offenses committed under a predecessor commander, the diffi-
culty of supervising his troops under trying combat conditions was a
major argument that might apply at least as forcefully in a successor
commander's defense. In his dissent to the Supreme Court's denial of
Yamashita's habeas corpus petition, Justice Murphy argued that "[t]o
use the very inefficiency and disorganization created by the victorious
forces as the primary basis for condemning officers of the defeated
armies bears no resemblance to justice or to military reality. 54
Whether inefficiency and disorganization were caused by the immi-
nent victory of opposing forces or by other factors, they could argua-
bly impact a commander's ability to pursue sanctions against mem-
bers of his troops who had committed violations before he personally
took command of them. This is the major objection to successor
commanders' responsibility to punish; the objection is significantly
qualified, however, by Major William H. Parks in his argument that
"subjective factors" should enter importantly into evaluation of any
command responsibility charge.55
2. Supporting Enforcement: Assignment Strategies and Military
Professionalism
Besides the standard of what a commander could reasonably
achieve in retrospective discipline of his troops, another element to
consider from the military point of view is the potential effect on
command assignment strategies if military supervisors took this pol-
54 LAEL, supra note 12, at 112.
55 Parks, supra note 13, at 90-95; see discussion infra in text accompanying note 66.
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icy into account when determining their arrangements of command-
ing officers. A cynical analysis might foresee supervisors exploiting
an available loophole in law enforcement. They might, for example,
deliberately promote commanders up the ranks of their own corps, so
that the new commanders' own implication in previously-committed
violations would limit their inclination to investigate and punish. 6 Or
alternatively, supervisors who wanted to arrange impunity for their
troops might move commanders from one post to another frequently
enough to avoid responsibility: if the commander in charge when
crimes occurred did not know of them, and was transferred before the
crimes were revealed, neither he nor his successor would satisfy both
knowledge and control requirements, so neither would be responsible
to punish the perpetrators. Either of these scenarios, both of which
cynically assume a command structure that wishes to allow law-of-
war violations by its rank and file, might suggest ulterior motives for
military personnel to argue against enforcement of successor com-
manders' duty to punish. But for military professionals who advocate
adherence to the customary laws of war, both of the above hypotheti-
cal situations yield arguments in favor of enforcing this duty.
3. Other Military Concerns Arguing for Enforcement Within Reason
Of course, military analysts who write or speak on the subject of
responsibility for violations of the laws of war emphasize the impor-
tance of defining and clarifying those laws so that they can be ob-
served and violations can be fairly dealt with. Colonel Eckhardt as-
serts that "the very heart of military professionalism is command re-
sponsibility" because it allows the commander, by "[clontrolling oth-
ers through training, discipline, and supervision," to achieve required
military objectives while "doing the least damage possible to the body
politic. '57 Writing with concern that the 1977 Protocols Additional to
the Geneva Convention of 1949 had failed to clarify international
standards for command responsibility sufficiently to put commanders
on fair notice, Eckhardt offered a nonmilitary hypothetical to illus-
trate one significant question and an underlying principle pertinent to
the present discussion:
56 This result might be a factor in the case of Amir Kubura, who was Chief of Staff in the
3rd Corps of the 7"
h Muslim Mountain Brigade in the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina from
January of 1993 to April of 1993, at which time he became substitute commander and later
commander. Indictment (Prosecutor v. Handzihasanovic), IT-01-47 (ICTY), 8 (July 5, 2001),
www.un.org/icty/indictment/english/had-iiO10713e.htm.
57 Eckhardt, supra note 41, at 8.
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Assume for a minute that a patrolman on the streets of New
York City, while being jostled by a crowd, unexpectedly pulls
his service revolver and shoots a number of innocent by-
standers. What is the criminal responsibility of the police
commissioner?... [I]s he criminally responsible for that par-
ticular act? Certainly if this police commissioner had re-
ceived reports of one or two similar incidents and did nothing
about them, then he might be criminally responsible. He
would have breached his duty to control his patrolman. His
inaction after being made aware of a series of incidents would
amount to a concerted policy and active encouragement to
commit similar illegal acts.58
Though speaking for the defense, Eckhardt illustrates that a supe-
rior who has received reports of past violations and has failed to take
corrective action has expressed "a concerted policy and active en-
couragement to commit similar illegal acts, 59 thus arguably incurring
command criminal responsibility. Eckhardt does not specify whether
his hypothetical police commissioner's criminal responsibility would
materialize upon his receiving the past-violation reports and failing to
act, or only upon the patrolman's repeating the violation-and this is
indeed the point that this discussion seeks to clarify. But Eckhardt's
use of the phrases "concerted policy" and "active encouragement"
supports the principle that the commissioner's breach of duty is his
failure to act, rather than the eventual predictable result of that failure.
Confirming this suggestion is the analysis by Major William H.
Parks, U. S. Marine Corps instructor in criminal and international law
at The Judge Advocate General's School. On the topic of "acquies-
cence," Parks notes that "[t]he commander is deemed to share respon-
sibility where he has knowledge of an offense and fails to take rea-
sonable corrective action. Notably, Parks' analysis does not spec-
ify that the offense must have occurred during the commander's own
period of supervision. In support of this point, Parks quotes the U.S.
Army Field Manual 27-10 for the proposition that commanders are
responsible for punishing violations by their subordinates; however,
he notes that:
[I]n seeking an answer to any question of a commander's ac-
quiescence a reverse tack is required. Current British military
law states this point by considering a commander to have ac-
58 Id. at 5.
59 ld.
60 Parks, supra note 13, at 80.
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quiesced in an offense "if he fails to use the means at his dis-
posal to insure compliance with the law of war;" in comment
it continues: "The failure to do so raises the presumption-
which for the sake of the effectiveness of the law cannot be
regarded as easily rebuttable-of authorization [sic], encour-
agement, connivance, acquiescense, or subsequent ratification
of the criminal acts.6'
Thus, hypothetical situations as well as theoretical and textual
analyses from representative military professionals present logical
support for the enforcement of a successor commander's duty to pun-
ish known violations committed under his predecessor.
It must be conceded that no judicial opinion yet located explicitly
articulates this responsibility. The ICTY Trial Chamber in Hadzi-
hasanovic stated that the responsibility exists "in principle," though
this decision was later overruled by the Appeals Chamber.62 Some
commentators have asserted that precedent for successor command-
ers' duty to punish is established in the High Command Case judg-
ment of Field Marshal von Kuechler at the Control Council Law No.
10 Tribunal in Nuremberg.63 The cited judgment states:
Subsequent to the time that the defendant assumed com-
mand of the Army Group North, the record discloses that
numerous reports showing such illegal executions were made
to his headquarters, covering a wide period of time. These
reports must be presumed in substance to have been brought
to his attention. In fact, his own testimony indicates he was
aware of these reports. There is no evidence tending to show
any corrective action on his part. It appears from the evi-
dence therefore that he not only tolerated but approved the
execution of these orders.
He must, therefore, be held criminally responsible for the
acts committed by his subordinates in their illegal execution
of Red Army soldiers and escaped prisoners of war.64
61 Id. at 81 (quoting British War Office, III Manual of Military Law (Law of War on
Land, 1958), 631, note 1).
62 Interlocutory Appeal, supra note 2, at 99 5, 57.
63 Boelaert-Suominen, supra note 37, at 767; Beth Van Schaack, Command Responsibil-
ity-A Step Backwards, 1 OTR ICC, Iss. 13 (Part 2) (July 7, 1998), at
http://www.advocacynet.org/news-view/newsI 19.html.
64 XI NUREMBERG TRIALS, supra note 35, at 568 (emphasis added).
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Again, the judgment does not explicitly articulate von Kuechler's
liability for events that occurred before his assumption of command.
Here, however, von Kuechler was tried alongside, among others,
Field Marshal von Leeb, from whom von Kuechler took over com-
mand of the Army Group North in January 1942. Both men were
charged with implementing the Commissar Order, issued by Hitler in
March 1941, which directed the killing of certain Russian soldiers.
Field Marshal von Leeb was found to have protested against the
Commissar Order and to have been without knowledge of the illegal
executions in question, and he was therefore acquitted on that charge.
Since von Kuechler was found guilty of having "not only tolerated
but approved" the executions, 65 which began before he assumed com-
mand, the inference that von Kuechler was held responsible for events
both before and after he assumed command seems justified.
Military professionals discussing the issue of command responsi-
bility generally put some emphasis on the difficulty of articulating
standards for enforcement because of the great variation in conditions
surrounding each case. Major Parks has presented an extensive dis-
cussion of twelve "subjective factors" that should be recognized and
considered on a case-by-case basis in efforts to evaluate a com-
mander's knowledge and responsibility to act, as well as interpreting
his acquiescence in violations by his subordinates. The factors Parks
mentions are: 1) the rank of the accused; 2) experience of the com-
mander; 3) the duties of the commander by virtue of the command he
held; 4) mobility of the commander; 5) isolation of the commander;
6) the "sliding probability ratio" of unit/incident/command ["the
greater the size of the offense and/or the unit involved, the higher in
the chain of command knowledge may be subjectively imputed"]; 7)
size of the staff of the commander; 8) comprehensiveness of the du-
ties of the staff of the commander; 9) communications abilities; 10)
training, age and experience of the men under his command; 11)
composition of forces within the command [joint or combined com-
mand more difficult than unified]; 12) combat situation [control more
difficult in fast-moving combat].66 Parks agrees with Professor Ar-
thur Rovine that in Yamashita General MacArthur committed a "great
injustice to international law by failing to appoint a law member" to
the tribunal "in light of the number of high-ranking officers tried by
tribunals whose membership included members of the bar., 67 Parks
thus emphasizes the importance of both legal and military factors in
65 id.
66 Parks, supra note 13, at 90-95.
67 Id. at 88-89 (referring to THE AIR WAR IN INDOCHINA 140-41 (Raphael Littauer & Nor-
man Uphoffeds., rev. ed. 1972)).
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assessing command responsibility. Eckhardt's concern that
"[m]odern law of war is driven by an idealistic internationally minded
community" working with an "inarticulate" standard68 is the main
military objection to stronger command responsibility enforcement,
and that objection should be satisfied by adequate attention to the
subjective factors outlined by Parks.
4. Summary of Military Perspective
In summary, analysis from the military point of view of the issue
of successor commanders' duty to punish generally favors enforcing
such a duty. There is concern that commanders be given fair notice
of their potential criminal liability for failure to punish; but comments
on the history, expectations, and published standards of professional
military conduct suggest that successor commanders' duty to punish
violations is a part of military tradition that is necessary for effective
operations. What is new is not the duty, but the form of enforcement
of that duty-through international criminal tribunals set up by the
humanitarian law establishment, rather than through military commis-
sions convened and operated within the military establishment itself.
In the still-developing interrelation of military, domestic, and interna-
tional law, seamlessness of coverage has not yet been achieved.69
Therefore, concerns over general principles of criminal law and of
humanitarian law must also be examined in exploring this issue.
B. Criminal Law Maxims Raising Concerns About Successor
Commanders' Duty to Punish
1. Fair Notice Concerns (Nullum Crimen/Nulla Poena Sine Lege and
Ex Post Facto)
Beginning with the establishment of the first International Tribu-
nals for the trials of war criminals following World War II, defen-
dants have argued the lack of precedent as a bar to the tribunals'
criminal jurisdiction. M. Cherif Bassiouni ° has said that the Nurem-
68 Eckhardt, supra note 41, at 3.
69 Parks notes, for example, a "jurisdictional defect" which prevents law-of-war violators
from being tried by non-military courts where they have left the military before their offenses
are uncovered-a defect which operated in post-Civil War cases, was called to Congressional
attention in 1902, operated again with regard to My Lai, and "has to this day gone unheeded."
Parks, supra note 13, at 10 n.27.
70 Professor of Law and President of the International Human Rights Law Institute,
DePaul College of Law; President, International Association of Penal Law; President, Interna-
tional Institute of Higher Studies in Criminal Sciences; Chairman, Drafting Committee of the
U.N. Diplomatic Conference on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court.
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berg and Tokyo tribunals "relied on a string of shaky historical legal
precedents, but they marked a turning point in history.",71 This state-
ment nicely expresses the ironic tension between the tribunals' ex-
pressing pride in holding war criminals individually responsible "for
the first time in history," and at the same time requiring evidence of
precedent to legitimize their criminal convictions. As Bassiouni fur-
ther noted,
[n]o longer were victors to mete out arbitrary punishment on
the defeated and their leaders on purely political grounds.
Thereafter, individuals would be brought before a tribunal,
ostensibly impartial, where procedures and forms attendant to
criminal adjudication would be followed, and only those
found guilty under that law would be punished according to
the wrongfulness of their deeds. Responsibility was individ-
ual and not collective, and no one could claim immunity as a
head of state. The previously recognized defense of "obedi-
ence to superior orders" was rejected. Each of these devel-
opments was an historic breakthrough.72
Not surprisingly, then, "during the prosecutions stemming from
World War II, the arguments of ex post facto and nulla poena sine
lege were consistently raised and were valid from a criminal law point
of view. 73
These broad arguments can be and have been countered to a
certain extent. It is true that specific penalties for the offenses
charged had not been established in advance, so it might seem the
nulla poene argument must be conceded; but the ex post facto
argument was met by the assertion that (as noted previously in the
discussion of the Yamashita tribunal) the offenses charged were
long established in customary international law as roughly codi-
fied in the Hague Conventions of 1907 and the Red Cross Con-
vention of 1929.74 Responses to these arguments vary widely.
Professor Jordan Paust in an article discussing "Applicability of
71 M. Cherif Bassiouni, Historical Development of Prosecuting Crimes Against Peace, in
III INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW: ENFORCEMENT 25, 26 (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., 1987)
[hereinafter Bassiouni, Historical Development].
72 Id.
73 M. Cherif Bassiouni, The Prosecution of International Crimes and the Establishment of
an International Criminal Court, in II INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW: ENFORCEMENT 3, 7
(M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., 1987) (citation omitted) [hereinafter Bassiouni, Prosecution of Inter-
national Crimes].
74 See LAEL, supra note 12, at 102 (stating the colonel faulted by "ignoring three crucial
international agreements .... All imposed grave responsibilities on military commanders"); see
also supra text accompanying note 33.
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International Criminal Laws to Events in the Former Yugosla-
via," suggested that
a new international tribunal could merely mirror any relevant
domestic law penalties as well as penalties evident in the cus-
tomary practice of nations. Those who attempt to invoke
nulla poena sine lege, or sine crimen [sic], arguments that
were rightly denounced at Nuremberg could thereby be es-
topped from doing so.75
This is in fact the approach taken in the establishment of the ad
hoc International Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and
for Rwanda, which purport to apply only customary international law,
and to impose penalties that typically would be applicable in the
courts of the countries in question.76 Elsewhere, Paust downplays the
ex post facto concern by opining that "[i]n a sense, all criminal con-
duct is second-guessed by the community or its representatives after
the fact. The law relating to superior orders and command responsi-
bility, though sometimes more obviously so, is no different."
7
On the other hand, the dissenting Supreme Court Justices in the
unsuccessful Yamashita habeas corpus petition protested that "[i]t is
not in our tradition for anyone to be charged with crime which is de-
fined after his conduct ... has taken place," and that "[n]othing in all
history or in international law, at least as far as I am aware, justifies
such a charge against a fallen commander of a defeated force., 78 And
in specific regard to the issue of a successor commander's duty to
punish, the Hadzihasanovic Appeals Chamber observed that "it has
always been the approach of this Tribunal not to rely merely on a
construction of the Statute to establish the applicable law on criminal
responsibility, but to ascertain the state of customary law in force at
the time the crimes were committed" and that "[i]n this particular
case, no practice. can be found, nor is there any evidence of opinio
juris that would sustain the proposition that a commander can be held
responsible for crimes committed by a subordinate prior to the com-
mander's assumption of command over that subordinate.,, 79 Thus the
75 Jordan J. Paust, Applicability of International Criminal Laws to Events in the Former
Yugoslavia, 9 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 499, 520 (1993-1994) [hereinafter Paust, Interna-
tional Criminal Laws].
76 Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolu-
tion 808 (1993), U. N. S.C. Doc. S/25704, paras. 111-15.
77 Jordan J. Paust, Superior Orders and Command Responsibility, in III INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL LAW: ENFORCEMENT 73, 88 (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., 1987) [hereinafter Paust,
Superior Orders].
78 LAEL, supra note 12, at 111-12 (quoting Rutledge & Murphy, JJ. respectively).
79 Interlocutory Appeal, supra note 2, 91[ 44-45.
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Appeals majority recognizes the precedential value of customary in-
ternational law-but requires clear evidence of the existence of such
custom, in contrast to the "shaky historical precedents" of the World
War II Tribunals or the concession to the "second-guessed" interpre-
tation suggested by Paust.
2. Validity of Fair Notice Concerns Arguable
Where, then, might we find evidence to support the assertion of the
Prosecutor and the dissenting judges in the Hadzihasanovic Appeals
Chamber that customary international law does provide for a succes-
sor commander's duty to punish violations committed by his subordi-
nates under a predecessor commander? The most conventional
sources are other codifications of the laws of war (since the majority
do not wish to merely rely on the tribunal's construction of the stat-
ute), including the more recent Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court and the published commentary on that Statute, as well
as the limited amount of case law on command responsibility.
a. Language of Conventions, Statutes, and other Documents
i. Protocol I
The document most crucial to clarifying the issue of successor
commanders' duty to punish is the June 8, 1977 Protocol Additional
to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and the related Protec-
tion of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol 1).8 0 This
is true for several reasons. The presentation of command responsibil-
ity doctrine in Articles 86 and 87 of Protocol I provides the first codi-
fication of the doctrine's elements, and reflects the widespread accep-
tance of those elements between 1949 and 1977.81 As a result, subse-
quent codifications have relied heavily on the wording of Protocol I;
echoes of Protocol I's Articles 86 and 87 occur in the Statutes of the
ICTY (1993) and ICTR (1994), in the Report of the International Law
Commission (ILC) and its Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace
and Security of Mankind (Draft Code) (1996), and in the Rome Stat-
ute of the International Criminal Court (1998). But an important and
arguably erroneous change in interpretation of Protocol I has emerged
starting with the 1996 ILC Draft Code; this change reappeared in the
80 PILLOUD, supra note 11.
81 1 VIRGINIA MORRIS & MICHAEL P. SCHARF, AN INSIDER'S GUIDE TO THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA: A DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY AND ANALYSIS 98-99 (1995).
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Rome Statute and, by way of those sources, as an important part of
the basis for the Hadzihasanovic Appeals Chamber decision.
The problem is that Article 86 ("Failure to act") states that a "su-
perior" is responsible for failure to act against violations that he
knows his subordinate "was committing or was about to commit,"
while Article 87 ("Duty of commanders") says that a commander has
the duty to act against violations that his subordinates "are going to
commit or have committed." The erroneous interpretation has as-
serted that the duty of commanders is defined in Article 86 only, and
therefore does not include acting against past violations-since only
the progressive and future verb phrases ("was committing or was
about to commit") can be applied to military commanders. That in-
terpretation has the effect of limiting a commander's duty to punish
only to violations that he knows are in progress or about to be com-
mitted, excluding violations that he knows have been committed.
This is an illogical interpretation and is contradicted by the plain lan-
guage of the Protocol and by the official ICRC Commentary on the
Protocol.
a) Article 86
Protocol I, Article 86, entitled "Failure to act," treats breaches of
international law arising from omissions. It contains two clauses.
Clause 1 provides that "[t]he High Contracting Parties and the Parties
to the conflict shall repress grave breaches, and take measures neces-
sary to suppress all other breaches, of the Conventions or of this Pro-
tocol that result from a failure to act when under a duty to do so."
82
The "High Contracting Parties," are the States themselves or their
organs.83 Thus, Article 86 focuses on responsibilities of Prime Minis-
ters and other administrative leaders to "repress grave breaches and..
. suppress all other breaches" resulting from failure to act. The dis-
tinction between the obligation to "repress grave breaches" and to
"suppress all other breaches" is discussed in the ICRC Commentary
on the Additional Protocols, where it is explained that "[g]rave
breaches must be repressed, which implies the obligation to enact
legislation laying down effective penal sanctions for perpetrators of
such breaches." 84 The Commentary then notes that legislation apply-
ing to any individual accused of breaches would of course be that of
82 PILLOUD, supra note 11, at 1005.
83 Id. at 1007, 3529 (stating "[tihe fact that a breach of the rules of applicable intema-
tional law may consist of an omission, i.e., a failure to act, just as well as an act by a State
organ, is uncontested nowadays. .
84 Id. at 1010.
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"his own national legislation," so "any 'repression' that might be un-
dertaken ultimately by penal or disciplinary sanctions are [sic] the
responsibility of the authority on which those committing such
breaches depend or the Power to which they belong., 85  However,
other Parties to the Protocol are given the right to suppress such
breaches (other than by enacting municipal legislation, which could
not apply to other States' nationals) "under the principle of universal
,,86jurisdiction. Thus, in Article 86, clause one, all Parties to the Pro-
tocol and the conflict are required and empowered to enforce the
terms of the Protocol.
The second clause of Article 86 goes on to clarify that these State
organs are responsible not only for acts or orders of high officials
themselves, but also for acts of their agents:
The fact that a breach of the Conventions or of this Protocol
was committed by a subordinate does not absolve his superi-
ors from penal or disciplinary responsibility, as the case may
be, if they knew, or had information which should have en-
abled them to conclude in the circumstances at the time, that
he was committing or was going to commit such a breach and
if they did not take all feasible measures within their power to
prevent or repress the breach.87
The Commentary provides nine paragraphs of discussion of this
clause, with extensive references to cases from the tribunals which
followed the Second World War. It notes that "[t]his rule concerns
both the immediate commander and his superiors. However, the spe-
cific duties of commanders are further dealt with in the detailed pro-
visions that will be examined under Article 87 (Duties of command-
ers). ,88
85 Id. at 1010-11.
86 Id. at 1011. In ordinary English usage:
Suppress [and] repress are general terms which mean to hold back, by the use of
more or less force .... Suppress ... usually implies the exercise of great ... power
or even of violence .... [flt often suggests the prompt use of effective methods; as,
to suppress an insurrection .... Repress, on the other hand, implies little more than
a checking, or restraining, sometimes by an external force, sometimes by the power
of the will or mind .... as, to repress one's curiosity .... [emphasis in original].
WEBSTER'S DICTIONARY OF SYNONYMS 812 (1st ed. 1951). The Protocol's use of both terms
seems rather to attempt a distinction between control imposed by municipal legislation and that
exercised by universal jurisdiction. The result is that all concerned Parties are empowered to
punish violators of the Protocol.
87 PILLOUD, supra note 11, at 1005.
88 Id. at 1015.
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Here is the point at which the erroneous interpretation of the Pro-
tocol has occurred. The International Law Commission, in its Report
on the work of its forty-eighth session (comprising the ILC's Draft
Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind and the
Special Rapporteur's commentaries on the Draft), stated that "[t]he
principle of individual criminal responsibility under which a military
commander is held responsible for his failure to prevent or repress the
unlawful conduct of his subordinates is elaborated in article 86 of
Protocol I.,,89 This statement taken alone is simply mistaken, as is
obvious from the Protocol I Commentary's pointing out that "specific
duties of commanders" are examined in Article 87. Nevertheless,
Article 6 of the ILC Draft Code echoes the language of Article 86(2)
and thus does not include the past-tense verb phrase that is so impor-
tant in this discussion. This seems to be an unfortunate error in draft-
ing, judging from other portions of the ILC Special Rapporteur's
commentary. 90 Reading Protocol I according to the ICRC Commen-
tary shows that the chief purpose of Article 86 is to make clear that
not only the "immediate commander" but also his superiors-
89 Report of the Commission to the General Assembly on the work of its forty-eighth ses-
sion, [1996] 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n, Part 2, at 25, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1996/Add.1 (Part2). 92 Elsewhere in the same paragraph, the Special Rapporteur's commentary notes that
"[tihe duty of commanders with respect to the conduct of their subordinates is set forth in article
87 of Additional Protocol I," and that "a military commander has a duty, where appropriate, to
initiate disciplinary or penal action against alleged offenders who are his subordinates." The
following paragraph asserts that the "text of this article [Draft Code Article 6] is based on the
three instruments mentioned in the preceding paragraph"-which are Additional Protocol I and
the Statutes of the ICTY (article 7) and the ICTR (article 6), all of which have the past-tense
verb phrase. Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its Forty-Eighth
Session, 6 May-26 July 1996, UN Doc. A/51/10, at 36-37. Available at http://ods-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GENN96/236/37IMG/N962363
7
.pdf, accessed 02/12/04. This dis-
connect between the Special Rapporteur's commentary and the draft articles themselves may be
explained by the fact that "Special Rapporteurs have tended . .. to operate in isolation from the
Commission," and that "draft articles are sometimes presented for final consideration by the
Commission without commentaries, and the commentaries are only adopted, with little time for
consideration, in the last stages of a session." Report of the International Law Commission on
the Work of its Forty-Eighth Session, Chapter VII A, "Programme, procedures and working
methods of the Commission and its documentation," reprinted in MAKING BETTER
INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION 50, Proceedings of the United
Nations Colloquium on Progressive Development and Codification of International Law 387-89
(1998). Elsewhere, the proceedings of the Colloquium just cited reveal that the authority of the
Draft Code is questionable at best, since it is listed in a group of "Cases in which the Commis-
sion has prepared a draft, but in which there has not been any follow-up action, [emphasis
in original]" and the last news of its status is that "the General Assembly decided to invite
governments to submit, before the end of the General Assembly's fifty-third session, comments
and observations on the action which might be taken in relation to the draft." Id. at 175-6. The
Proceedings further note that "a cursory examination of the Commission's record reveals that
there have been instances in which drafts which the Commission has prepared have not con-
formed with the requirements of the General Assembly and so have had to be abandoned with-
out further action." ld.at 178.
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including high government officials-can be held liable for failure to
act. The Commentary goes on to emphasize this purpose: "[t]he pre-
sent provision [Article 86, Paragraph 2] merely poses the principle of
the indictment of superiors who have tolerated breaches of the law of
armed conflict."9'
The Commentary on Article 86(2) does include the elements of
command criminal responsibility:
Under the terms of this provision three conditions must be
fulfilled if a superior is to be responsible for an omission re-
lating to an offence committed or about to be committed by a
subordinate:
a) the superior concerned must be the superior of that subor-
dinate ("his superiors");
b) he knew, or had information that should have enabled him
to conclude that a breach was being committed or was going
to be committed;
c) he did not take the measures within his power to prevent
it.
9 2
Within this explanation, the temporal application is already unclear
(the chapeau gives past and future, "committed or about to be com-
mitted," while element (b) gives only present and future, "being
committed or was going to be committed") and the preceding Com-
mentary is careful to note that "[t]his provision.., should be read in
conjunction with paragraph 1 and Article 87 (Duty of commanders),
which lays down the duties of commanders. 93 How, then, can one
justify relying solely on Article 86(2) to define temporal application
of command responsibility for military commanders?
The erroneous assertion that "criminal offence based on command
responsibility is defined in Article 86(2) only ' 94 is a major factor in
the perpetuation of the loophole for successor commanders' duty to
91 PILLOUD, supra note 11, at 1015. Moreover, Pilloud does not limit the Article 86 liabil-
ity of high officials to toleration of progressive and future violations: "information available to
a superior may enable him to conclude either that breaches have been committed or that they are
going to be committed .... Every case must be assessed in the light of the situation of the
superior concerned at the time in question .. . ." Id. at 1014, 3545. This approach is similar to
that of Major Parks, discussed supra in text accompanying note 55.
92 Id. at 1012-13, 3543.
93 Id. at 1011, 3541.
94 Interlocutory Appeal, supra note 2, 48 (citing Celebici Appeal Judgment (Prosecutor
v. Delalic), IT-96-21 (ICTY), 237).
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punish. Careful attention to Article 87 and the ICRC Commentary on
it emphasizes the wrongness of that assertion.
b) Article 87
Article 87 of Protocol I ("Duty of commanders") begins, like Arti-
cle 86, with the phrase "The High Contracting Parties," and it may be
this wording that has led some commentators to conclude that Proto-
col I "requires states to ensure that their military commanders prevent
grave breaches by persons under their control, but does not suggest
that a failure by the commanders to do so incurs more than state re-
sponsibility. 95 On the contrary, Article 87 represents the Protocol's
attempt to "make the control of the application of the Conventions
and the Protocol part of the duties of military commanders. 96 The
Commentary elucidates this purpose at some length:
According to the sponsors of the proposal which was behind
the rule under consideration here: "in its reference to 'com-
manders', the amendment was intended to refer to all those
persons who had command responsibility, from commanders
at the highest level to leaders with only a few men under their
command.97
The importance of this distinction-why it matters whether Article 86
or Article 87 is more pertinent to the duties of military commanders
in the field-lies in the tenses of the verb phrases in Article 87, para-
graph 3, which are referred to above and will be discussed below.
98
For the sake of a clear comparison, all of Article 87 is reproduced
here:
95 RATNER & ABRAMS, supra note 10, at 128. This comment by Ratner and Abrams cites
to Article 83 ("Dissemination"), which covers the obligation of High Contracting parties and
their civilian and military authorities to "encourage the study" of and "be fully acquainted with"
the text of the Conventions and the Protocol; this suggests a lack of careful attention to either
Article 86 or Article 87. A similar assumption is expressed by the Hadzihasanovic Appeals
Chamber majority's statement that "it is Article 86, paragraph 2 ... that expressly addresses the
individual responsibility of superiors for acts of their subordinates, while Article 87 speaks of
the obligations of States parties." Interlocutory Appeal, supra note 2, 53.
96 PILLOUD, supra note 11, at 1019, 3552.
97 id. at 1019, 3553 (citing to IX Official Records of the 1974-1977 Conference, at 120,
70, Doc. CDDH/I/SR.50). The attached footnote further explains, "[t]his statement was not
contested. Some delegations would even have wished this clarification to have been included in
the text of the Protocol in order to avoid any ambiguity, as the word 'commander' is not always
understood in the same way in the armies of different countries." Id. at 1019 n.7 (citation omit-
ted).
98 See supra text accompanying note 81, and infra notes 107-12.
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Article 87-Duty of commanders
1. The High Contracting Parties and the Parties to the conflict
shall require military commanders, with respect to members
of the armed forces under their command and other persons
under their control, to prevent and, where necessary, to sup-
press and report to competent authorities breaches of the
Conventions and of this Protocol.
2. In order to prevent and suppress breaches, High Contract-
ing parties and parties to the conflict shall require that, com-
mensurate with their level of responsibility, commanders en-
sure that members of the armed forces under their command
are aware of their obligations under the Conventions and this
Protocol.
3. The High Contracting Parties and Parties to the conflict
shall require any commander who is aware that subordinates
or other persons under his control are going to commit or
have committed a breach of the Conventions or of this Proto-
col, to initiate such steps as are necessary to prevent such vio-
lations of the Conventions or this Protocol, and, where appro-
priate, to initiate disciplinary or penal action against violators
thereof.
The opening section of the Article 87 Commentary, after remarking
on the inherent duty of a military commander to discipline his troops
according to the system he is part of, states that this Article "enjoins
the High Contracting Parties and the Parties to the conflict to ensure
that military commanders carry out this task."99 In case one were
tempted to infer from this language that failure of commanders to do
so would not incur "more than a state responsibility," it is important
to recall the Article 86 Commentary that responsibility of the com-
mander's own Power to discipline him "does not detract from the
right of States under customary law.., to punish serious violations of
the laws of war under the principle of universal jurisdiction."'1° That
is to say, if Parties to the conflict do not enforce these duties of their
commanders, then other States should do so under the principle of
universal jurisdiction, such as by the formation of International
Criminal Tribunals. After all, as the Nuremberg Tribunal observed
99 PILLOUD, supra note 11, at 1018, 3549.
1I0d. at 1011, 3539.
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and the ICTY Appeals Chamber has quoted with approval, "Crimes
against international law are committed by men, not by abstract enti-
ties, and only by punishing individuals who commit such crimes can
the provisions of international law be enforced."' 0'
Still further emphasis is laid on the application of Article 87 to in-
dividual commanders, as the opening section of the Commentary
notes that this Article concerns "the very essence of the problem of
enforcement of treaty rules in the field," that "the role of commanders
is decisive," and that "the necessary measures ... must be taken at the
level of the troops, so that a fatal gap between the undertakings en-
tered into by Parties to the conflict and the conduct of individuals is
avoided."
10 2
In the commentary on the individual clauses of Article 87, the ap-
plication is still clearer. The overarching principle is that "this re-
sponsibility applies from the highest to the lowest level of the hierar-
chy, from the Commander-in-Chief down to the common soldier who
takes over ... at the moment his commanding officer has fallen."'
0 3
The Commentary goes on to give hypothetical examples of the duty,
since the terms "should be understood very specifically, if full practi-
cal meaning is to be given to the provision."' 4 It explains the exten-
sion to "other persons under their control," noting that a commander
must control temporary replacement troops as long as they are with
him, and that a commander in occupied territory "must consider that
the local population entrusted to him is subject to his authority ... for
example, in the case where some of the inhabitants were to undertake
some sort of pogrom against minority groups. 10 5 Even a commander
who "without being invested with responsibility in the sector con-
cerned, discovers that breaches have been committed... is obliged to
do everything in his power to deal with this."'
0 6
Paragraph 2 of Article 87 concerns the commanders' responsibility
to disseminate among their troops information about the troops' obli-
gations under the Conventions and the Protocol. It addresses "fair
notice" concerns of military personnel, and is therefore important to
the issue of command criminal responsibility, but it is not a contro-
versial element of the present discussion.
101 Appeals Judgement (Prosecutor v. Delalic), IT-96-2 1-A (ICTY), 162 (2001) (citing
Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction (Prosecutor v. Du{ko
Tadi)), IT-94-1-AR72 (Oct. 2, 1995)).
10 2 PILLOUD, supra note 11, at 1018,19 3550.
10. Id. at 1019,9 3553.
14Id. at 1019,9 3554.
05ld. at 1020, 3555.
106Id.
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Paragraph 3 of Article 87 is the paragraph that explicitly contains
the past-tense verb phrase in describing breaches that a commander
must address. The fact that this phrase (placing responsibility on
"any commander who is aware that subordinates ... have committed
a breach") does not appear in Article 86(2) (or, consequently, in the
ILC Draft Code or the Rome Statute) is relied on by the Hadzihasa-
novic Appeals Chamber in holding that successor commanders' duty
to punish is unenforceable. However, the Commentary both under-
cuts such a distinction and gives illustrations that lend support to the
enforcement of that duty. The early section of the Commentary notes
that "the measures ... which military commanders must take ... (i.e.,
to prevent, suppress, and where necessary, report such
breaches)... are indicated again in paragraph 3 with a slightly differ-
ent wording, though without any substantial modification as regards
the basic meaning. ,107 Thus, the difference in verb tenses should not
be read as indicating a substantial limitation on the duty.
In addition, the discussion of Article 87(3) includes specific re-
marks that implicate successor commanders' duty. It is noted that
"more than anyone else they [commanders] can prevent breaches by
creating the appropriate frame of mind ... and by maintaining disci-
pline. '08 The acquiescence in breaches, that is expressed by a suc-
cessor commander's knowing failure to punish them and its resulting
bad effect on the subordinates' "frame of mind," is a major historical
and rational basis of the duty. And further, commanders "are in a
position to establish or ensure the establishment of the facts, which
would be the starting point for any action to suppress or punish abreach."' 1 9 This investigative role also attaches strongly to the posi-
tion of a successor commander. In sum, the Commentary notes that
"[t]he object of these texts is to ensure that military commanders at
every level exercise the power vested in them."' 10 Among the closing
remarks in the Commentary is that "some delegations remarqued [sic]
that Article 87 contains provisions which are already found in the
military codes of all countries," so that the articulation there "is
merely a question of ensuring that they are explicitly applicable with
respect to ... the Protocol.""' In all, the Commentary on Articles 86
and 87 places great weight on the importance of military command-
ers' duty to enforce the provisions of Protocol I. The fact that it does
not expressly identify successor commanders' duty to punish as a
107 Id. at 1020, 3556 (emphasis added).
108 Id. at 1022, 3560.
109Id.
0 Id. at 1022, 3562.
11Id. at 1023, 3562.
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separate case implies, as Judge Hunt suggests with regard to military
manuals' handling of the question, "that the duty to punish in that
situation is so obvious that no-one [sic] has ever seen the need to refer
to it expressly."
' 1 2
The final observation to be made at this point is that the analysis of
Protocol I Articles 86 and 87 and the accompanying Commentaries
not only directly supports the enforcement of successor commanders'
duty to punish, but also calls into serious question the Appeals Cham-
ber's reliance on the ILC Draft Code and the Celebici decision,"
3
which refer only to Article 86 for authority on command criminal
responsibility.
ii. Commentaries on Statutes of the ICTY and ICTR
Although the Appeals Chamber majority decline to be limited by a
mere "construction of the Statute" under which they operate, it is nec-
essary for the clarity of this discussion to set forth the Statute's com-
mand responsibility provisions. The Statutes of the International
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and the International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, promulgated in 1993 and 1994, follow
the model of Protocol I, including the elements from both Articles 86
and Article 87 and thus employing both past and future time frames to
specify commanders' individual criminal responsibility for failure to
prevent, halt, or punish breaches. ICTY Statute Article 7 and ICTR
Statute Article 6, respectively, provide that:
The fact that any of the acts referred to in articles 2 to 5 of the
present Statute was committed by a subordinate does not re-
lieve his superior of criminal responsibility if he knew or had
reason to know that the subordinate was about to commit
such acts or had done so and the superior failed to take the
necessary and reasonable measures to prevent such acts or to
punish the perpetrators thereof.
In view of the above discussion, and the fact that the ICTs are spe-
cifically empowered to prosecute those responsible for serious viola-
tions rather than State organs, it seems very likely that the Statute
drafters deliberately chose inclusion of the past-tense phrase so as to
follow Protocol I in allotting to a commander the duty to punish vio-
lations that may have occurred before his arrival on the scene-since
112 Separate and Partially Dissenting Opinion of Judge Hunt (Prosecutor v. Hadzihasano-
vic), rr-01-47 (ICTY), 12 (July 16, 2003), http://www.un.org/icty/hadzihas/appeal/decision-
e/030716so.htm (regarding Interlocutory Appeal, supra note 2) [hereinafter Hunt].
113 See supra note 94.
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exclusion of the past-tense language opens "a fatal gap""H 4 allowing
such violations to fall between the cracks. This suggestion is sup-
ported by the fact that the documentary history of the Statute's adop-
tion includes three superseded draft versions that did not include the
past-tense element as well as a note verbale from the Netherlands
representative on 4 May 1993 suggesting that:
[T]he following offences in particular should be within the
competence of the ad hoc tribunal:
-The fact of having ordered, authorized or permitted the
commission of war crimes and/or crimes against humanity,
and
-The fact of being in a position "to influence the general
standard of behaviour" and having culpably neglected to take
action against crimes of that kind. 115
Thus, when the Statute was adopted at the 3217 th meeting of the
Security Council on 25 May 1993, Mrs. Albright of the United States
could clarify that "[w]ith respect to paragraph 1 of Article 7, it is our
understanding that individual liability arises in the case of . . . the
failure of a superior ... to take reasonable steps to prevent or punish[Article 2 through 5] crimes by persons under his or her authority."'" 16
The intention to include the duty to punish within the Statute, and the
implication that violations should not be allowed to go unpunished
because of changes of command assignments, is also confirmed by
the Venezuelan representative's statement that the adoption of the
Statute responds to the international community's awareness that
"[n]othing encourages crime more than impunity."'' 17
Further interpretive commentary on the ICTY Statute is offered by
Professor M. Cherif Bassiouni, who points out that the Statute does
not contain a "general part" ordinarily providing definitions of the
"constitutive elements of the crimes." Although some such provi-
sions appear in Article 7 of the Statute (comprising the explanation of
command responsibility), "none of these questions are defined with
the minimum specificity required in most criminal justice systems."' 18
The Tribunal must therefore "fill these legal gaps," relying on the
114 PILLOUD, supra note 11, at 1018, 3550; fuller reference supra note 98.
"1 2 MORRIS & SCHARF, supra note 81, at 475 (emphasis added).
1I61d. at 188 (emphasis added).
1171d. at 183.
's M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, THE LAW OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR
THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA 340 (1996) [hereinafter BASSIOUNI, LAW OF ICTY].
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"limited guidance" offered by customary international law. Bassiouni
elsewhere remarks that "[tjhe rules enacted by the judges and the ju-
risprudence of [the ICTY and ICTR] ... filled the 'legislative' gap,
even though raising doubts about the fairness of this judge-made ap-
proach .... Thus, while the exercise was necessary, the method by
which it was achieved is open to question.""19 The doubts about the
fairness of "the judge-made approach" will be discussed below, as
will the admittedly limited guidance to be gleaned from judgments of
earlier international tribunals.12
0
Another source of ICTY background information is the reports of
the Commission of Experts whose preliminary work influenced the
subsequent drafting of the Statute by the U.N. Office of the Legal
Advisor. Regarding a commander's duty to prevent, halt, or punish
violations, the Commission of Experts' interim repQrt includes the
following statements:
In particular, a military commander who is assigned com-
mand and control over armed combatant groups who have
engaged in war crimes in the past should refrain from em-
ploying such groups in combat, until they clearly demonstrate
their intention and capability to comply with the law in the
future. Thus, a commander has a duty to do everything rea-
sonable and practicable to prevent violations of the law.
Failure to carry out such a duty carries with it responsibility.
Lastly, a military commander has the duty to punish or
discipline those under his command whom he knows or has
reasonable grounds to know committed a violation.' 2'
In the last sentence of this excerpt the order of clauses, in addition
to the choice of verb tenses, reveals an assumption of the successor
commanders' duty to punish. The commander "has the duty to punish
... those under his command whom he knows... committed a viola-
tion." If the duty were limited to cases where violations were com-
mitted after the commander's taking charge, the clearer wording
would be "those whom he knows committed a violation under his
command."'122 The present wording of this report shows that the focal
119 GEERT-JAN G. J. KNooPs, DEFENSES IN CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
LAW, at xxxi (2001).
120 See infra text accompanying notes 184-92 and 138-52, respectively.
121 BASSIOUNI, LAW OF ICTY, supra note 118, at 343.
122 Thanks to Professor Dale Nance for pointing out this important rhetorical point. Note a
similar pattern in the ILC Special Rapporteur's commentary, supra note 90.
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elements are the commander's authority over the subordinate and his
knowledge of the offense-not the time when the offense occurred.
Also noteworthy in the above excerpt is the commander's duty to
reform before reemploying "groups who have engaged in war crimes
in the past." In the Hadzihasanovic case, whose Interlocutory Appeal
yielded the negative ruling on successor commanders' duty to punish,
"the troops commanded by [Kubura] from April 1993 had a history of
unpunished criminality."1 23 This would therefore be a situation where
the principle of case-by-case evaluation of individual facts 124 should
be carefully carried out. That approach was clearly suggested by the
Trial Chamber's holding that "in principle" Kubura could be charged,
though of course the facts of the case would need to support the
charge. Unfortunately, such an approach is precluded by the Appeals
Chamber's ruling.
Lastly, the Report of the Secretary-General accompanying the
draft Statute for the ICTY, which presents the Statute's official legis-
lative history, addressed the issue of command responsibility as fol-
lows:
A person in a position of superior authority should, therefore,
be held individually responsible for giving the unlawful order
to commit a crime under the present statute. But he should
also be held responsible for failure to prevent a crime or to
deter the unlawful behaviour of his subordinates. This im-
puted responsibility or criminal negligence is engaged if the
person in superior authority knew or had reason to know that
his subordinates were about to commit or had committed
crimes and yet failed to take the necessary and reasonable
steps to prevent or repress the commission of such crimes or
to punish those who had committed them. 125
W. J. Fenrick, in commenting on this provision, notes that "[a]l-
though Article 7(3) is infelicitously worded, it provides a basis for
liability independent of Article 7(1).,,126 The infelicitous wording of
the Statute makes the temporal application of commanders' duty to
punish less clear than it might be, but the Secretary General's Report
123 Interlocutory Appeal, supra note 2, 43 (citing Prosecution's Response to Defence
Written Submissions on Joint Challenge to Jurisdiction Arising from the Amended Indictment(Prosecutor v. Hadzihasanovic), IT 01-47 (ICTY), 121 (May 24, 2002)).
124 Discussed in detail by Parks, supra note 13, at 90-95; presented in this text supra note
66.
125 Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolu-
tion 808, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess, 56, U.N. Doc. S/25704 (1993) (emphasis added).
1
26 Fenrick, supra note 7, at I 11.
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clarifies the engagement of the duty at the point when the commander
knows his subordinates are about to commit or had committed crimes,
without limiting under whose command the crimes might have been
committed.
iii. Various War Manuals
Another source of guidance for interpreting the specific elements
of command responsibility is an overview of manuals of military or-
ganizations. Attention to military manuals is appropriate both be-
cause military tradition created command responsibility doctrine and
because military organizations must train soldiers to carry out that
responsibility.
In a survey of war manuals of various countries, Major General
A.P.V. Rogers cites segments from Australian, United Kingdom, and
United States war manuals that include the past-tense provision as
part of the commander's responsibility:
Australia (1996)
The commander will be held responsible if the commander:
a. knows subordinates are going to commit war crimes and
does not prevent them,
b. knows subordinates have committed war crimes and does
not punish them,
c. should know subordinates are going to commit war crimes
and does not prevent them, or
d. should know subordinates have committed war crimes and
does not punish them. 127
U.K. (1958)
The commander is also responsible, if he has actual knowl-
edge or should have knowledge, through reports received by
him or through other means, that troops or other persons sub-
ject to his control are about to commit or have committed a
127 A. P. V. Rogers, Command Responsibility Under the Law of War, 15, at
www.law.cam.ac.uk/rcil/COMDRESP.doc (last visited Sept. 2003) (citing Australian Defence
Force Publication 37, Law of Armed Conflict, 1996, para. 1303) (emphasis added).
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war crime and if he fails to use the means at his disposal to
ensure compliance with the law of war. 128
U.S.A. (1997)
Commanders are responsible for war crimes committed by
their subordinates when any one of three circumstances ap-
plies:
a. The commander ordered the commission of the act;
b. The commander knew of the act, either before or during its
commission, and did nothing to prevent or stop it; or when
c. The commander should have known, "through reports re-
ceived by him or through other means, that troops or other
persons subject to his control [were] about to commit or
[had] committed a war crime and he fail[ed] to take the nec-
essary and reasonable steps to insure compliance with the law
of war or to punish violators thereof. 129
All of these excerpts are significant as evidence of the customary
assumption that a commander is responsible to punish offenses that
his subordinates have committed in the past-not only to prevent or
halt ongoing offenses. Since the absence of the past tense language in
some documents was taken by the Appeals Chamber to "militate
against" the inference of successor commander responsibility, con-
versely its presence in these manuals supports the inference.
The U.S. Army Field Manual is most specific in breaking out the
various temporal applications: clause b, regarding prevention or halt-
ing of the violation, acknowledges the necessary limitation of this
course of action to the commander who knows of the violation "be-
fore or during" its commission, while clause c introduces the past
tense to emphasize the necessity of punishing past actions when they
become known to the commander. This is a simple distinction, but its
presence in military field manuals suggests that command responsi-
bility for offences under a predecessor commander is assumed in cus-
tomary military law. Taken together with the Protocol I distinction
(which gives broader temporal application to the disciplinary respon-
28 Id. at 15 (citing War Office, Manual of Military Law Part III, HMSO, 178 (1958)) (em-
phasis added).
129 Id. at 17 (citing United States Army JAG School, Operational Law Handbook, at 18-11(1997) based on Field Manual FM 27-10, at 501) (alterations in original) (emphasis added).
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LA W REVIEW
sibility of commanders in the field than of politicians at a distance) it
further strengthens the case for the broad temporal application of the
duty to punish prong of command responsibility doctrine.
iv. The Rome Statute
Many organizations worked long and hard toward the completion
of the Rome Treaty of 17 July 1998, establishing the International
Criminal Court. The international humanitarian law community cele-
brated the Treaty's coming into force upon the completion of the req-
uisite number of endorsements in 2002. However, the Rome Statute
has some weaknesses and limitations, and unfortunately its treatment
of command criminal responsibility is one of them. In his Preface to
the Commentary on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal
Court, M. Cherif Bassiouni recounts some of the difficulties that
faced the drafters of the Statute:
By the time the Preparatory Committee's "consolidated" text
reached the responsible officials in late May [1998], officials
had little time to study the text, brief their superiors, and ob-
tain appropriate instructions on political and complex legal
issues .... This process was difficult for many of the dele-
gates who were in Rome for the Diplomatic Conference,
many of whom were new to the subject .... By the second
week of the Diplomatic Conference, as many as 15 groups
met at different times and places throughout the FAO build-
ing without the benefit of interpretation. . . . As a result of
these circumstances, the groups working on different portions
of the Draft Statute completed their work at different times
and without any logical or legal sequence .... The Drafting
Committee, therefore, received disparate articles or parts of
articles without subject matter sequence and at different
times; it was like receiving pieces of an enormous jigsaw
puzzle .... The Drafting Committee completed its work on
approximately 120 articles on Wednesday, 15 July, and sub-
mitted it to the Committee of the Whole which, remarkably,
approved them in under two hours .... Consequently, only
those who had worked on specific provisions of the Statute
could draft a legislative history to interpret those provisions
[of the Statute]. 3 °
130 M. Cherif Bassiouni, COMMENTARY ON THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL COURT, at xix-xx (Otto Triffterer ed., 1999) [hereinafter COMMENTARY ON THE
ROME STATUTE].
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This long description of the difficulties faced by the Rome Statute
drafters is pertinent because of the emphasis it places on the need for
expert commentary as a clarifying device. Although the 1999 Com-
mentary is not an official document endorsed by the ICRC, it is called
"both timely and useful" by Drafting Committee Chairman Bas-
siouni.1 31 Its usefulness here is that it offers a variant interpretation
on the very point for which the Hadzihasanovic Appeals Chamber
referred to the ICC Statute: the time-frame reference of its command
responsibility provision.
The Rome Statute itself in Article 28 follows the arguably errone-
ous132 1996 International Law Commission Draft Code, including
only present and future violations in commanders' duty to punish, and
omitting the retrospective duty established in Protocol I, Article 87.133
However, the commentary, which according to Bassiouni provides
useful guidance in the interpretation of the Statute, offers the follow-
ing gloss on Article 28 (a) element 5, "failure to exercise control
properly":
As reflected in article 87 of First Add. Prot., a commander
has a duty to take all practicable measures to ensure his forces
comply with international humanitarian law. In particular,
the commander must:
-ensure his forces are adequately trained in interna-
tional humanitarian law,
-ensure that due regard is paid to international hu-
manitarian law in operational decision making,
-ensure an effective reporting system is established so
that he or she is informed of incidents when viola-
tions of international humanitarian law might have
occurred,
-monitor the reporting system to ensure it is effective,
and
131 Id. at xx.
131 See supra notes 89-91 and accompanying text.
13 Protocol I Article 86 and the ILC Draft code require the commander's knowing a sub-
ordinate "was committing or was going to commit" a crime; the Rome Statute uses the same
tenses, though in the plural-subordinates "were committing or about to commit" crimes-
whereas Article 87 uses the importantly different retrospective language, requiring the com-
mander to know that subordinates "are going to commit or have committed' crimes.
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-take corrective action when he or she becomes
aware that violations are about to occur or have oc-
curred.
134
Again, one must concede that this language does not explicitly
identify a successor-commander situation as one that it means to
cover. But under this interpretation, it is at least clear that the Hadzi-
hasanovic Appeals Chamber majority were mistaken in concluding
that "Under the Rome Statute ... command responsibility can only
exist if a commander knew or should have known that his subordi-
nates were committing crimes, or were about to do so.
'
,,35
Indeed, the Hadzihasanovic problem was anticipated by an NGO
observer of the Rome Conference. Beth Van Schaack, writing for
Advocacynet in July 1998, warned that the ICC Statute as drafted
would "significantly truncate the scope of the doctrine of command
responsibility" because "[u]nder the current formulation ... no liabil-
ity attaches where the superior did not know that subordinates were
about to commit or were committing crimes, but did know later that
international crimes 'had been committed' and failed to take steps to
have them investigated and punished."' 136 Van Schaack here calls
attention to the above-discussed Protocol I language that appears in
the International Criminal Tribunal Statutes and numerous military
manuals but did not make it into the Rome Statute. Expressing a fur-
ther concern arising from this same omission, Van Schaack focuses
directly on the temporal application problem that arose in Hadzihasa-
novic; she notes that as part of its "step backward," the Rome Statute
as written:
would not reach the superior who takes control of subordi-
nates after international crimes had been committed and fails
to punish the perpetrators. . . .This formulation of the doc-
trine of command responsibility sends the following message:
once international crimes are committed by subordinates, the
superior can be conveniently "gotten rid of' and no one at the
level of command and control will be held liable for the
crimes of the subordinates. This loophole combined with the
current formulation of Article [33], which allows for the de-
1'4 William J. Fenrick, Article 28: Responsibility of Commanders and Other Superiors, in
COMMENTARY ON THE ROME STATUTE, supra note 130, at 518-19 (emphasis added).
135 Interlocutory Appeal, supra note 2, 46.
136 Van Schaack, supra note 63.
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fense of superior orders, creates a lacuna in international
criminal responsibility where it did not exist before. 137
In summary, the statutory evidence used by the Hadzihasanovic
Appeals Chamber to support its holding against successor command-
ers' duty to punish is fundamentally flawed. It consists of a signifi-
cantly incomplete reference to Protocol I (citing only Article 86 but
not the crucially complementary Article 87) and two other documents
(the ILC Draft Code and the ICC Rome Statute) that appear to spring
from the same incomplete reference to the same source. Signifi-
cantly, both of these documents are modified by commentaries (the
Rapporteur's concurrent commentary on the Draft Code; the subse-
quent expert commentary on the Rome Statute) that restore the retro-
spective application of Article 87.
b. Case Law
The Appeals Chamber also examined case law in its search for
guidance, and the materials discovered there offer similarly weak
support for the majority position.
i. Kuntze
The Appeals Chamber considered the Kuntze case 38 from the Nur-
emberg Control Council No. 10 Tribunal:
[T]his case ... constitutes an indication that would run con-
trary to the existence of a customary rule establishing com-
mand responsibility for crimes committed before a superior's
assumption of command over the perpetrator, and that it
could certainly not be brought to support the opposite view. 139
The Kuntze case as referenced by the Appeals Chamber includes
Kuntze's being charged with responsibility for "alleged mistreatment
of Jews and others occurring within the area under Kuntze's com-
mand." 0 The Appeals Chamber quotes Tribunal language that as-
serts that Kuntze's responsibility for unlawful acts is "amply estab-
lished" because "[i]t is quite evident that he acquiesced in their per-
formance when his duty was to intervene to prevent their recur-
137 Id.
138 XI NUREMBERG TRIALS, supra note 35, at 1230 (In the matter of the United States v.
Wilhelm List, et al.).
13 9 Interlocutory Appeal, supra note 2, at 50.
140 Id.
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rence." 41 The Appeals Chamber's commentary in a footnote points
out that:
While it is clear that this judgment recognizes a responsibility
for failing to prevent the recurrence of killings after an ac-
cused has assumed command, it contains no reference what-
soever to a responsibility for crimes committed prior to the
accused's assumption of command. 1
42
It is true that no such reference appears, but that is hardly surpris-
ing since all of the unlawful acts with which Kuntze was charged took
place after he assumed command. The more significant language in
the quoted excerpt is the Tribunal's holding that "it is quite clear that
he acquiesced" in the performance of the unlawful acts-since this
directly echoes the Control Council No. 10 High Command Case
14 3
standard that in order for a commander to be held criminally negligent
for failure to properly supervise his subordinates, "it must be a per-
sonal neglect amounting to a wanton, immoral disregard of the action
of his subordinates amounting to acquiescence." 44 Thus the logical
inference is that the Control Council No. 10 Tribunal held Kuntze
responsible for his acquiescence in the unlawful killings, which was
revealed by his failure to intervene-but which could also be revealed
by a failure to punish known violations that had occurred under a
predecessor commander.
ii. von Kuechler/von Leeb
A potentially more useful case from the Control Council No. 10
Tribunal is that of Field Marshal von Kuechler from the High Com-
mand Case. Von Kuechler was commander of the 18th Army from
1940 to January 1942 when he "took over the command of Army
Group North, as successor to Field Marshal von Leeb." 145 In the High
Command Case, both von Leeb and von Kuechler were tried on vari-
ous command responsibility charges. Whereas von Leeb was acquit-
ted on most of the charges against him,'46 von Kuechler was held re-
141 Id. at 50 n.65 (citing XI NUREMBERG TRIALS, supra note 35, at 1279-80).
142 Id.
14-The High Command Case is the other famous Control Council No. 10 command re-
sponsibility case, along with the von List "Hostage Case" of which Kuntze is a part. See supra
notes 35-38 and accompanying text.
144 XI NUREMBERG TRIALS, supra note 35, at 543-44.
145 Id. at 566.
146 For example, he was found not guilty of carrying out the Commissar Order which re-
quired the murder of Russian political officers because "fh]e did not disseminate the order. He
protested against it and opposed it in every way short of open and defiant refusal to obey it." XI
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sponsible for "[i]llegal execution of Red Army soldiers and murder
and ill-treatment of prisoners of war" in his command of Army Group
North, for violations which occurred over "a wide period of time":
Subsequent to the time that the defendant assumed com-
mand of the Army Group North, the record discloses that
numerous reports showing such illegal executions were made
to his headquarters, covering a wide period of time. These
reports must be presumed in substance to have been brought
to his attention. In fact, his own testimony indicates he was
aware of these reports. There is no evidence tending to show
any corrective action on his part. It appears from the evi-
dence therefore that he not only tolerated but approved the
execution of these orders.
He must, therefore, be held criminally responsible for the
acts committed by his subordinates in their illegal execution
of Red Army soldiers and escaped prisoners of war. 14 7
This pair of cases (von Leeb and von Kuechler) illustrates the im-
portance of the case-by-case evaluation of command-responsibility
charges advocated by Major Parks. 48 Crimes against prisoners of
war apparently took place within the jurisdiction of Army Group
North during the command of von Leeb as well as that of von
Kuechler. However, in von Leeb's last months of command, "[a]s
General von Leeb was heavily engaged during this period with the
initial phases of the siege of Leningrad, a matter he was desperately
attempting to conclude before winter, he had neither the authority nor
the means of ascertaining what treatment prisoners of war were re-
ceiving."' 149  Also, "[s]ubordinate units within General von Leeb's
command responsible for the handling of prisoners of war were simi-
larly responsible directly to the German High Command."' 150  As a
result, the Tribunal found that von Leeb "had the right to assume that
the officers in command of those [subordinate] units [charged with
responsibility] would properly perform the functions that had been
NUREMBERG TRIALS, supra note 35, at 557 (quoted in Parks, supra note 13, at 45). For
"Crimes Against Prisoners of War" he was acquitted because "evidence failed to show von Leeb
possessed either knowledge or a duty to know of crimes committed against prisoners of war"
because "responsibility for prisoners at that time was in the hands of the quartermaster general."
Parks, supra note 13, at 45.
147 XI NUREMBERG TRIALS, supra note 35, at 568.
148 See supra text accompanying note 66.
149 Parks, supra note 13, at 46.
150 Id. at 45-46.
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entrusted to them."'151 In contrast, when von Kuechler took over com-
mand of the Army Group North and demonstrably received numerous
reports of ill-treatment of prisoners, his failure to take corrective ac-
tion was interpreted by the Tribunal as acquiescence that invoked
liability for criminal negligence.
Without specific dates to pinpoint the "wide period of time" in
which the Army Group North offenses took place, it is not possible to
categorically assert that von Kuechler was held responsible for viola-
tions that occurred under von Leeb. 152 However, the facts of the two
cases invite that interpretation, and explanations in the tribunal's
judgments do not rule it out. More importantly, it is clear that without
the possibility of holding the successor commander responsible in this
case, those violations that occurred while von Leeb was too fully en-
gaged in combat to monitor prisoner-of-war treatment (and therefore
did not possess the requisite knowledge to establish liability) would
have been beyond the reach of the tribunal-even though they had
been acquiesced in and thus encouraged by the successor commander.
This illustrates the loophole created by the current wording of the
Rome Statute's Article 28 (absent the interpretive commentary by
Fenrick), and which is also allowed for in the Appeals Chamber's
Decision on the Interlocutory Appeal in Hadzihasanovic. The loop-
hole should be closed.
iii. ICTY Judgment, Prosecutor v. Kunarac
Another useful discussion of the temporal application of command
responsibility, this time in case law from the ICTY, emerges from the
judgment in the case of Dragoljub Kunarac, who was convicted of
torture and rape under both'Article 7(1) of the Statute (individual
criminal responsibility) and Article 7(3) of the Statute (command
responsibility. This decision gives detailed treatment to temporal
application of the first element of command responsibility, the exis-
tence of a superior/subordinate relationship. It points out that the
authority of a superior might be either permanent or temporary or
might even be on an ad hoc basis.1 53 The judgment goes on to distin-
151 Id. at 46 (citing XI NUREMBERG TRIALS, supra note 35, at 558). Parks adds: "The au-
thor would qualify this statement with what may be the obvious, as follows: A commander has
the right, within reason, to assume, etc. What is reasonable under the circumstances would
depend on a number of criteria, all of which relate to putting a commander on notice." Id. at 46
n. 144. Parks there refers the reader to his list of subjective factors. See supra note 66.
152 Nevertheless, Boelaert-Suominen, supra note 37, , and Van Schaack, supra note 60, do
draw that conclusion.
153 Trial Chamber Judgment (Prosecutor v. Kunarac), IT-96-23-T & IT-96-23/1 -T (ICTY),
399 (Feb. 22, 2001), http://www.un.org/ictylkunarac/trialc2/judgement/kun-tjOI0222e.pdf.
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guish command responsibility of temporary or ad hoc commanders
from permanent ones:
To be held liable for the acts of men who operated under him
on an ad hoc or temporary basis, it must be shown that, at the
time when the acts charged in the Indictment were committed,
these persons were under the effective control of the particu-
lar individual. 
154
Since the court points out that ad hoc or temporary commanders do
not have responsibility for their temporary subordinates outside the
time frame of their actual effective control, the converse is strongly
implied: that is, it is reasonable to infer that a commander who takes
up a "permanent" command assignment does have responsibility for
his long-term subordinates outside the time frame of his actual effec-
tive control. Otherwise, why would the court specify that "it must be
shown that, at the time when the acts charged in the Indictment were
committed, [the perpetrators] were under the effective control of the
particular individual" particularly in the case of "men who operate
under [the superior] on an ad hoc or temporary basis"?1 55 This is
analogous to situations where commanders have attempted to escape
command responsibility on the grounds that they were away from
their posts when certain events took place-this argument has not
been accepted from a permanent commander. 56
While the presumption of a commander's knowledge of and there-
fore of his responsibility for his subordinates' illegal actions may be
rebutted by "a showing of absence from the command at the time of
the offense," still that rebuttal is "temporary in nature, extending only
for the period of the absence," and "[a]ny inaction upon resumption
of command raises a presumption of acquiescence, knowledge again
being presumed."' 157 If a commander is liable for failure to punish
violations that he discovers have taken place during a time when he
was temporarily away from his command, it follows logically that he
should also be liable for failure to punish violations that he discovers
have taken place prior to his assuming command.
Referring again to Parks' list of "subjective factors,"' 5 8 it is under-
standable that a commander who has only brief ad hoc control over a
15 Id. at 1399.
155 Id.
156 See, e.g., Parks, supra note 13, at 74 (pointing out that Major General Shigeru Sawada
was convicted for executions of prisoners that took place in his absence, since upon his return he
acquiesced in the deeds).
157Id. at 103.
158 Parks, supra note 13, at 90-95; see supra text accompanying note 66.
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subordinate, but no ongoing superior/subordinate relationship, should
not be held responsible for violations by that subordinate in some far
removed setting. But a new permanent superior who learns that one
or more of his regular subordinates has engaged in violations of the
laws of war should be held responsible for punishing or reporting
such violations or else held liable for acquiescing in them.
Hence, the discussion of temporal application in Krnojelac sup-
ports the proposition that a commander who takes up a command
where he knows or soon learns that his new subordinates have already
committed violations of the laws of war has an affirmative duty to
take appropriate penal or disciplinary action-and that his failure to
do so amounts to acquiescence in the violations, resulting in his own
criminal liability.
iv. Kordic & Cerkez
Among the ICTY cases which have discussed command responsi-
bility (or superior responsibility, using the term that more clearly in-
cludes civilian as well as military superiors), another case including
comments useful to this discussion is Prosecutor v. Kordic & Cerkez,
in which the charges "relate, inter alia, to the persecution, killing,
inhuman treatment and unlawful imprisonment of Bosnian Muslims,"
both on the defendants' individual responsibility and in their capacity
as superiors. In this judgment, the Trial Chamber determined that:
The duty to punish naturally arises after a crime has been
committed. Persons who assume command after the commis-
sion are under the same duty to punish. This duty includes at
least an obligation to investigate the crimes to establish the
facts and to report them to the competent authorities, if the
superior does not have the power to sanction himself.
59
Importantly, the Trial Chamber in this judgment refers to the ICRC
Commentary on Protocol I, Article 87, thus confirming that docu-
ment's endorsement of successor commanders' (or superiors') duty to
punish.
The force of this point has been partly conceded even by the de-
fense in Hadzihasanovic, as noted in Judge Shahabuddeen's partial
dissenting opinion. In a Response to the Prosecution's Brief, the de-
fense noted that:
159 Trial Chamber Judgement (Prosecutor v. Kordic), IT-95-14/2-T (ICTY), 1446 (Feb. 26,
2001), http://www.un.orglicty/kordic/trialc/judgementlkor-tjO10226e.pdf (citing COMMENTARY,
supra note 11, at 1022, 3562).
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[T]he obiter from the Kordic Judgement is partly right. A
commander cannot turn a blind eye, if he finds out that a vio-
lation was committed by a subordinate before he assumed
command. If he fails to punish this subordinate, the com-
mander may be individually responsible for an offence, but
not pursuant to the doctrine of command responsibility as he
had no responsibility towards the perpetrator when the of-
fence was committed.16
0
As Judge Shahabuddeen notes, "it is difficult to isolate the specific
branch of [international criminal] law which imposes criminal re-
sponsibility [in such a case] if it is not command responsibility."' 16'
v. Dissents in Hadzihasanovic
The separate and dissenting opinions of Judge Hunt and Judge
Shahabuddeen in the Hadzihasanovic case are well argued and well
illustrated. Judge Hunt maintains that successor commanders' duty to
punish "reasonably falls within" the customary international law prin-
ciple of command criminal responsibility and that denial of its en-
forcement undermines the Vienna Convention on Treaties principle
that documents should be "interpreted in good faith in accordance
with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms ... in their context
and in the light of [the document's] object and purpose."' 162 Judge
Shahabuddeen concludes that denial of successor commanders' duty
to punish is "at odds with the idea of responsible command on which
the principle of command responsibility rests.' 63 As Professor Theo-
dor Meron (now Judge Meron, coincidentally a member of the Hadzi-
hasanovic Appeals Chamber majority) has written about an earlier
ICTY case, "the narrowness of the majority (three to two) and the
cogency of [the] dissent may suggest that the jury is still out on this
question."' 64 One may hope that the Hadzihasanovic Interlocutory
Appeal Decision will be one of those decisions that appear occasion-
160 Partial Dissenting Opinion of Judge Shahabuddeen (Prosecutor v. Hadzihasanovic), IT-
01-47 (ICTY), 36 (July 16, 2003), http://www.un.org/icty/hadzihas/appeal/decision-
e/030716do.htm#33 (regarding Interlocutory Appeal, supra note 2) [hereinafter Shahabuddeen].
161 Id. at 137.
162 Hunt, supra note 112, at IN 8, 22.
163 Shahabuddeen, supra note 160, at 14.
164 THEODOR MERON, WAR CRIMES LAW COMES OF AGE 89 (1998) (referring to Prosecu-
tor v. Erdemovic in which an Appeals Chamber judgement ruled "that duress does not afford a
complete defence to a soldier charged with a crime against humanity and/or ... killing of inno-
cent human beings." Appeals Chamber Judgement (Prosecutor v. Erdemovic), IT-96-22-A
(ICTY), 19 (Oct. 7, 1997), http://www.un.org/icty/erdemovic/appeal/judgement/erd-
aj971007e.pdf).
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ally in legal history where the dissent ultimately becomes the ac-
cepted view.
3. Other Criminal Law Concerns: Imputed Responsibility
In addition to the fair notice issue, which essentially rests on the
interpretation of customary international law discussed above, two
other concerns from the general criminal law perspective should be
addressed-the question of imputed responsibility and the principle
that doubtful interpretations should be decided in favor of the ac-
cused.
As indicated by the foregoing discussion, the task of the Interna-
tional Tribunals in applying command responsibility doctrine is com-
plex:
The action required depends on when the superior knew or
should have known about the crime. A person who has the
authority and the opportunity to prevent a crime and fails to
do so is to some extent responsible for the fact that the crime
occurred. Similarly, a person who learns that a subordinate
has committed a crime and fails to take measures to punish
the perpetrator is not only condoning the crime committed but
also sending a signal that such crimes can be committed with
impunity, thereby encouraging rather than deterring the
commission of additional crimes in the future. In such cir-
cumstances, the superior's failure to act may be viewed as
contributing to the commission of the crime or as implicating
the superior in the crime by conferring impunity on the perpe-
trator. It will be for the International Tribunal to determine
the degree of culpability of a superior for a crime committed
by a subordinate in light of the facts and circumstances of the
case and bearing in mind the exceptional nature of this basis
for individual criminal responsibility. 16
5
By "exceptional nature of this basis for individual criminal respon-
sibility,"'' 66 the comment above seems to suggest what may seem fa-
cially implied, that command responsibility amounts to "imputed li-
ability" of the commander for the deeds of his subordinates. How-
ever, this theory has been rejected by tribunals since the post-World
War II era. Although some commentators have suggested that the
Yamashita trial actually imposed vicarious liability (a discussion this
165 1 MORRIS & SCHARF, supra note 81, at 100-01.
1661id.
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Note will not pursue), every comment since that time has "refused to
accept the vicarious responsibility or strict liability theory.' 6 7  In-
stead, command responsibility is seen as a crime of omission, in
which the commander fails to control his subordinates when under a
duty to do so. It does not, as Judge Shahabuddeen notes, make the
commander "guilty of an offence committed by others even though he
neither possessed the applicable mens rea nor had any involvement
whatsoever in the actus reus. ,,"168 Rather, it holds the commander
"guilty for failing in his supervisory capacity to take the necessary
corrective action after he knows or has reason to know that his subor-
dinate was about to commit the act or had done So.' ' 169 Or, as the Pre-
paratory Committee for the ICC Statute put it, regarding Article 28
(Draft article 25): "[t]his language is directly drawn from the Geneva
Protocol [Protocol I] and recognizes that command culpability is
based on the failure to fulfill an official duty and is not an imputation
of liability for the acts of subordinates."'
70
In further clarification, the unofficial commentary on Article 28 of
the ICC Rome Statute explains that "[t]o a degree, the doctrine of
command responsibility might be regarded as a special form of ac-
complice liability applicable to military commanders held criminally
liable for a failure to act."' 17' A clearer definition of this "special
form" of liability may be one strategy for closing the current loop-
hole. 1
72
4. Criminal-Law Uncertainty to be Resolved in Favor of the Accused
Another criminal law issue that should be addressed is the princi-
ple that where questions of law cannot be clearly resolved on other
grounds, they should be decided in favor of the accused. Judge Sha-
habuddeen also deals with this question:
[T]he interlocutory appeal pleads that "[u]ncertainty in the
law must be interpreted in favour of the accused." As I un-
derstand the injunctions of the maxim in dubio pro reo and of
the associated principle of strict construction in criminal pro-
16
7 Parks, supra note 13, at 72, 103.
168Shahabuddeen, supra note 160, 32.
1
69 Id.
170 Matthew Lippman, Humanitarian Law: The Uncertain Contours of Command Respon-
sibility, 8.2 TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L. 1, 86 (2001) (citing Report of the Preparatory Commit-
tee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, art. 25, n. 12 A/Conf. 183/Add. 1
(1998), reprinted in THE STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 142 (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., 1998)).
17' Fenrick, supra note 134, at 517.
172 See discussion infra note 197 (regarding suggestions by Bing Bing Jia).
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ceedings, those injunctions operate on the result produced by
a particular method of interpretation but do not necessarily
control the selection of the method. The selection of the
method in this case is governed by the rules of interpretation
laid down in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.
It is only if the application of the method of interpretation
prescribed by the Convention results in a doubt which cannot
be resolved by recourse to the provisions of the Convention
itself-an unlikely proposition-that the maxim applies so as
to prefer the meaning which is more favourable to the ac-
cused. In my view, that is not the position here: there is no
residual doubt. 1
73
Since the issue of successor commanders' duty to punish is likely to
arise repeatedly in future cases before international criminal tribunals,
the best course would be to resolve the statutory confusion that has
resulted from the partial scrambling of Protocol I. A clear and ex-
plicit definition of successor commanders' duty to punish would con-
firm Judge Shahabuddeen's position of "no residual doubt."
C. Commentaries by Publicists in International Humanitarian Law
Supporting the Closing of this Loophole
The writings of prominent publicists are another traditional source
of customary international law. In the context of multiple interna-
tional tribunals dealing with atrocities committed in various conflicts
during the late twentieth century, many publicists have commented on
command responsibility. Several have expressed concern that narrow
application of command responsibility doctrine will perpetuate a "cul-
ture of impunity" that allows combatants to consider atrocities a vi-
able option and an effective way to achieve their goals.
One such concern is expressed by Professor Jordan Paust, in a
comment on the ICC Rome Statute:
One problem is that Article 28(1)(a) addresses circumstances
where subordinates "were committing or about to commit"
crimes, but does not expressly include the circumstance also
addressable under customary international law where a supe-
rior knew or should have known that crimes had already been
committed and the superior fails to take needed corrective ac-
tion within his or her power. Perhaps the next paragraph, ad-
dressing, for example, failures to "repress their commission
173 Shahabuddeen, supra note 160, 12.
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or to submit the matter to the competent authorities for inves-
tigation and prosecution," when coupled with customary in-
ternational law as an interpretive background, will assure ade-
quate coverage.
174
Such "adequate coverage," against the interpretive background of
customary international law should, then, include the enforcement of
successor commanders' duty to punish.
While comments specifically focused on the temporal application
of command responsibility doctrine are not plentiful, those that have
been made are reinforced by a wide range of commentaries advocat-
ing broad and persistent reinforcement of command responsibility.
Professor Ilias Bantekas of the Westminster University School of Law
has discussed the doctrine in general, asserting that "Article 7(3) of
the ICTY Statute, Article 6(3) of the ICTR Statute, Article 86(2) of
Geneva Protocol I and Article 28(1)(a) of the ICC Statute firmly es-
tablish the existence of a duty to prevent and a duty to punish the
crimes of subordinate persons."' 175 Bantekas goes on to advocate the
enforcement of successor commanders' duty to punish, explaining its
rationale in some detail:
A superior's "duty to punish" arises after the commission of
an offense. It is predicated upon offenses by others which
have already occurred, not future offenses. Punishment is,
therefore, intended to deter the commission of future of-
fenses .... The duty to punish does not require a pre-existing
relationship to those who perpetrated the offenses, as this
would have been part of the incumbent superior's preventive
duty at the time the offenses occurred. Thus even persons
who assume command after such offenses have taken place
are under a duty to investigate and punish the offenders....
Tolerating criminal conduct, as evidenced by the failure to
punish, is tantamount to acquiescence. 7
6
Professor Matthew Lippman points out that "[c]ommand culpabil-
ity is designed to encourage military commanders and civilian superi-
174 Jordan J. Paust, Content and Contours of Genocide, Crimes Against Humanity, and
War Crimes, in INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE POST-COLD WAR WORLD: ESSAYS IN MEMORY OF
Li HAOPEI 289, 305 (Sienho Yee & Wang Tieya eds., 2001) (citing Protocol I, the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties and the Rome Statute Art. 21 (1)(b) and (3)).
175 Ilias Bantekas, The Contemporary Law of Superior Responsibility, 93 AM. J. INT'L L.
573,591 (1999).
1761d. at 592.
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ors to fulfill their legal duty to control the conduct of combatants."'
177
This is important for many reasons. Payam Akhavan concludes that
"[b]eyond retribution and the moral impulse to vindicate humanitar-
ian norms, individual accountability for massive crimes is an essential
part of a preventive strategy and, thus, a realistic foundation for a
lasting peace."' 178 One reason why this is true is that "[a] post conflict
culture of justice ... makes moral credibility a valuable political asset
for victim groups, rendering vengeance less tempting and more
costly.' 179 In the current climate of increased attempts to enforce
command responsibility, "[t]here is at least modest anecdotal evi-
dence to suggest that some individual actors in the former Yugoslavia
have adhered more closely to the requirements of international hu-
manitarian law than they would have otherwise, for fear of prosecu-
tion."'18 This is in contrast to a 1993 report that "in response to a
rebellion by Serbian troops, . . . Karadzic promised officers that if
they returned they would not be punished for their roles in war
crimes."'18 1 On the hopeful assumption that such progress is in fact
being made, the international legal community should continue to
accumulate precedents of accountability, not truncating but rather
giving full force to customary international law in order to "serve
notice on all personnel in command that.. . should they choose not to
enforce energetically the law of war, they do so at their own peril."'
' 82
III. POSSIBLE REMEDIES FOR THE LOOPHOLE
Given, however, that two important recent documents (the ICC
Rome Statute and the Hadzihasanovic Appeal Decision) have regis-
tered opposition to the enforcement of successor commander duty to
punish, what available remedies are most likely to reverse the trou-
bling drift toward allowing impunity in this admittedly narrow terri-
tory of international humanitarian law?
177 Lippman, supra note 170, at 90.
178 Payam Akhavan, Beyond Impunity: Can International Criminal Justice Prevent Future
Atrocities?, 95 AM. J. INT'L L. 7, 10 (2001).
179 id. at 7.
180 David Wippman, Atrocities, Deterrence, and the Limits of International Justice, 23
FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 473, 475 (1999-2000).
181 Christopher N. Crowe, Command Responsibility in the Former Yugoslavia: The
Chances for Successful Prosecution. 29 U. RICH. L. REV. 191,231-32 (1994-1995).
182 LAEL, supra note 12, at 142.
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A. Hadzihasanovic Appeals Decision: Could be Overruled by a
Subsequent Decision 183
The Hadzihasanovic Appeals Chamber decision could conceivably
be overruled in a subsequent decision, since the cases that may reach
the Appeals Chamber from the former Yugoslavia and from Rwanda
could very well include further instances of successor commanders'
failure to punish their subordinates' violations of the laws of war.
Would such an overruling give rise to a prospective/retroactive appli-
cation problem, or charges of judicial activism?
The question of prospective overruling versus retroactive applica-
tion of judicial decisions has been discussed since early in the history
of the common law. The historical argument for retroactivity, dating
back to Blackstone, is that judges do not "pronounce a new law, but
[rather] maintain and expound the old one."'184 According to that the-
ory, "if it be found that [a] former decision is manifestly absurd or
unjust, it is declared, not that such a sentence was bad law, but that it
was not law; that is, that it is not the established custom of the realm,
as had been erroneously determined."' 185
Thus the practice of retroactive overruling was meant to minimize
the impression of judicial law-making, since judges were said not to
be making law at all, but only explaining it. However, in criminal law
it has been pointed out that "problems might... be presented ... by
retroactive application of an overruling decision which reinterprets a
criminal statute and, in effect, announces the 'creation of a judicial
crime. '"18 6 Application of the overruling decision to acts done during
the intervening period might thus violate the defendant's right to fair
notice.1 87 Other objections raised to retroactive overruling have been
that it could unfairly surprise persons who had justifiably relied upon
previous decisions, that the latter problem might inhibit judges from
overruling outmoded precedents, and that the retroactivity policy it-
self might actually misrepresent the "lawcreating function" claimed
by Legal Realists. 188 Thus some judges, among them Justice Car-
dozo, have advocated prospective overruling on the following
grounds:
183 The Hadzihasanovic case is going forward with an indictment amended to reflect the
Appeals Chamber decision.
184Note, Prospective Overruling and Retroactive Application in the Federal Courts, 71
YALE L. J. 907, 907 (1961-1962) (quoting 1 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 69 (1769)) [herein-
after Prospective Overruling].
185 Id. at 908 (quoting 1 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 68-71 (1769)).
186 Id. at 910 (citing James v. United States, 366 U.S. 213, 224 (1961)).
187 Id.
1
88 /d. at 910-11.
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The rule that we are asked to apply is out of tune with the life
about us. It has been made discordant by the forces that gen-
erate a living law. We apply it to this case because the [judi-
cial] repeal might work hardship to those who have trusted to
its existence. We give notice, however, that any one trusting
to it hereafter will do so at his peril.1 89
Differing approaches to the question of prospective or retrospec-
tive application of overrulings have been taken, depending on the
events involved and the judicial philosophies advocated. In the case
of Great Northern Railway v. Sunburst Oil & Refining Co, Justice
Cardozo writing for the Supreme Court declared that for purposes of
United States law, "the federal constitution has no voice upon the
subject" of prospective overruling.' 90
In the case of the ad hoc Criminal Tribunals, neither prospective
nor retrospective overruling of this interpretation could clearly be
argued to be unfair to the litigants, since the tribunals are established
with the assumption that they will be applying customary interna-
tional law as it existed at the time of the Statutes' creation-perhaps
with a conceded element of judicial lawmaking, according to Bas-
siouni's assessment noted above. In principle, however, the Judges
are clearly intending to follow Blackstone's theory of explaining
rather than creating the law. The element of unfair surprise is
unlikely to be significant because "in a great many cases ... the par-
ties will have acted without any knowledge at all of what the govern-
ing law was. ' 191  As one venerable commentator has suggested,
"[p]ractically, in its application to actual affairs, for most of the laity,
the law, except for a few crude notions of the equity involved in some
of its general principles, is all ex post facto."'192 Ideally, all of the
litigants in command responsibility cases would be so well grounded
in military tradition that their awareness of their duty would not be a
serious question. In practice, an overruling of this decision would not
result in a retrying of Kubura; the indictment against him has been
amended to reflect the outcome of the appeal, 193 and the trial will go
forward on that basis. But it should be possible for other commanders
18 9 ld. at 912 (quoting Cardozo, Address Before N.Y. State Bar Association, 55 REP. N.Y.
STATE BAR ASS'N. 263, 296 (1932)).
19OGreat Northern Ry. v. Sunburst Oil & Ref. Co., 287 U.S. 358, 364 (1932); see also
Prospective Overruling, supra note 184, at 922.
191 Prospective Overruling, supra note 184, at 945.
19 2 Id. at 946 (quoting JOHN CHIPMAN GRAY, THE NATURE AND SOURCES OF LAW 100 (2d
ed. 1921)).
193 Third Amended Indictment (Prosecutor v. Hadzihasanovic), IT-01-47-PT (ICTY) (Sept.
26, 2003), http://www.un.org/icty/indictment/english/had-3ai030926e.htm.
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accused of failure to punish predecessor-commander violations to be
held responsible for that failure, since a reinterpretation would (as
Blackstone suggested) be a declaration not that customary interna-
tional law has been changed, but only that it was misrepresented in
the Hadzihasanovic Interlocutory Appeal Decision.
B. ICC Rome Statute Clarification
The International Criminal Court is meant to be in place for the
trial of any international criminal case in which the domestic court
concerned is unwilling or unable to hold a fair trial. The intention is
that in case of future problems analogous to (though one hopes less
extensive than) those in the former Yugoslavia or Rwanda, the legal
establishment for criminal prosecutions would already be in place and
the difficult process of establishing ad hoc tribunals would be obvi-
ated. Cases can be brought before it by any of the States parties to the
Court or by the Prosecutor with the approval of a three-judge prelimi-
nary panel.
As indicated by the comments of Bassiouni in his Preface to the
Commentary on the Rome Statute 194 there were many difficulties in
the formulation of the Statute at the Rome Conference, and many
political negotiations and compromises added to the considerable
logistical challenges to produce a Statute that, while admirable in
many ways, still is open to improvement. Jelena Pejic, a Lawyers'
Committee for Human Rights participant at the Rome Conference,
has noted that "NGO support [for the Statute at the Rome Confer-
ence] was based on ... a determination to work to improve the ICC
Statute in the years ahead."' 195 It is therefore hoped that the language
of the command responsibility segment of the ICC Statute can be
brought into line with the Protocol I language that, according to the
ICC Statute's Commentary, the Statute is meant to reflect. Some
NGO representatives have expressed concern over the weaker knowl-
edge standard for civilian superiors, which was probably a major
source of negotiation and compromise; 196 but the temporal application
element, which does appear to have been pre-established in Protocol I
and which the Commentary suggests that the Statute ought to follow,
should be adjusted to prevent future tribunals from repeating the in-
terpretation of the Hadzihasanovic Appeals Chamber.
1
94 See supra note 130 and accompanying text.
195 Jelena Pejic, The International Criminal Court Statute: An Appraisal of the Rome
Package, 34 INT'L LAW. 65, 69 (2000).
1
96 See, e.g., Van Schaack, supra note 63.
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A form that such revision might take is suggested by an analysis of
the problem by Bing Bing Jia, Legal Officer of the ICTY Chambers:
It is obviously difficult to punish a commander as an accom-
plice if he came to the troops after a war crime had been per-
petrated by them, in which crime he had no role whatsoever,
thus being unable to prevent its commission in any way. On
the other hand, .. . it does make sense that the successor com-
mander may incur liability if he failed to repress the crime by
punishing the offenders, thus preventing a recurrence. His
failure in this situation may produce the result of concealment
of the crime, thus assisting the culprits in avoiding penal
sanction. His subordinate could take his failure as implied
approval of the deed. For this case, it may be possible to say
that the assisting person ('accessory after the fact' in common
law) should normally be subject to a lesser penalty that the
principal(s), as is the case in certain systems of domestic
law.197
Although amending the Statute itself would be difficult because of
built-in safeguards to its stability, subsidiary documents such as the
Elements of the Crimes could more easily incorporate a definition of
successor commanders' failure to punish as an offense of accessory
after the fact.
C. General Influence of U.N. Bodies on International Law
Although it is somewhat unlikely, in the interest of continuing the
worldwide effort to eliminate impunity for war crimes a Security
Council or General Assembly Resolution on the subject of successor
commanders' duty to punish could be introduced. Such a resolution
would not be binding on tribunals, but would be evidence of custom-
ary international law that could be influential in future decisions in
this still formative area of law. A Resolution of this type following
the first Persian Gulf War established important principles of envi-.. . . 1 w 198
ronmental protection as part of international criminal law. A strat-
197 Bing Bing Jia, The Doctrine of Command Responsibility: Current Problems 2 Year-
book Int'l. Humanitarian Law 131, 161-162 (2000) (citing P. Saland, 'International Criminal
Law Principles,' THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: THE MAKING OF THE ROME STATUTE
204 (Roy Lee, ed.) (1999)).
198 Stephanie N. Simonds, Conventional Warfare and Environmental Protection: A Pro-
posal for International Legal Reform, 29 STAN. J. INT'L L. 165, 166 (1992) (citing U.N. GAOR
6'h Comm., 46"h Sess., U.N. Doc. GA/IJ2707 (1991)).
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egy to end impunity for human rights violations might attract enough
interest to spur a similar Resolution in its support.
D. Military Establishment Adjustments
In line with Major Eckhardt's Vietnam-era suggestion, military or-
ganizations could increase the level of training, and raise the level of
observance of the traditional military value of protection of the weak
and unarmed, possibly in some ways a higher standard than can be
imposed from outside. This solution would seem to be practicable in
the case of military professionals, for whom as General MacArthur
declared, respect for the laws of war is an essential part of their code:
The soldier, be he friend or foe, is charged with the protection
of the weak and unarmed. It is the very essence and reason
for his being. When he violates this sacred trust he not only
profanes his entire cult but threatens the very fabric of inter-
national society. The traditions of fighting men are long and
honorable. They are based upon the noblest of human
traits-sacrifice. 99
An appeal to the honorable tradition of fighting men might be less
clearly applicable to the non-professional combatants who now carry
on so many extended conflicts than it was to the members of MacAr-
thur's sacred cult. But even so, spreading the word that atrocities will
ultimately be punished may help to prevent some of them from being
committed.
IV. CONCLUSION
An examination of the history, documentation, and current status
of command responsibility doctrine shows that steps are needed to
ensure and clarify the enforcement of successor commanders' duty to
punish their subordinates' violations of international humanitarian
law. It is certainly true that the rights of individuals, both victims and
defendants, should be guarded by the rule of law. However, Profes-
sor Jordan Paust has pointed out that customary international law, if
applied "without extra limitations not found in customary interna-
tional law," can be administered by international tribunals in such a
way as "to avoid problems connected with 'the principle nullem cri-
men sine lege."' 20 I f this is done, Paust's fear that "[t]he prohibition
199LAEL, supra note 12, at 118 (quoting MacArthur's review of the Yamashita judgment).
20 Jordan Paust, Threats to Accountability After Nuremberg: Crimes Against Humanity,
Leader Responsibility and National Fora, 12 N.Y.L. ScH. J. HUM. RTS. 547, 554 (1994-1995).
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of crimes against humanity is in danger of being whittled away by
newly invented and restrictive definitions '20 1 may be averted. Profes-
sor Lippman has asserted that "[m]issing from the jurisprudence of
command responsibility is the moral dimension. The legal niceties
divert attention from the question of whether there is an ethical im-
perative or privilege to intervene to prevent war crimes ... ,,22
Clearly there is such an ethical imperative, and it is recognized by
many commentators, both military and legal. That principle supports
enforcement of successor commanders' duty to punish; the interna-
tional humanitarian law community should therefore take steps to
close the current loophole through which individuals who should be
held responsible can now escape that enforcement.
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